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Abstract 
 
This study was designed to explore the ways that caseworkers in the Minnesota Family 
Investment Program (MFIP) make decisions in situations of client noncompliance.  The research 
question was: what factors impact the decision-making of MFIP caseworkers around the question 
of noncompliance?  Ten in-person interviews were conducted, recorded, coded and analyzed.  
Caseworkers identified that client noncompliance can be caused by mental illness or 
environmental factors in clients’ lives such as lack of community capital and transportation 
infrastructure or domestic violence.  Caseworkers also identified that client noncompliance is 
frequently caused by factors internal to the MFIP bureaucracy, which clients have little influence 
on.  Although some caseworkers indicated clients can be to blame for noncompliance, 
caseworkers also referred to numerous ways that the structure of the MFIP system itself 
contributes to client noncompliance.  Recommendations include cross-training caseworkers with 
social workers and mental health providers, increasing service coordination and collaboration, 
and abolishing punitive financial sanctions in the MFIP program in order to establish incentive-
based casework methods.  Further research can be conducted on the ways that factors at the 
micro, meso and macro levels affect caseworker decision-making, and what changes can be 
made to improve services to clients and contribute to an overall reduction in family poverty. 
 Keywords: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, TANF, welfare sanctions, 
discretion, street level bureaucracy, mental illness 
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Introduction 
Poverty persists as a major issue in the United States, with the Census Bureau reporting 
the official poverty rate in 2015 as 13.5 percent of the country’s population, meaning 43.1 
million people.  Of this 43.1 million, 33.6 percent were children (14.5 million children), meaning 
19.7 percent of the national child population was in poverty in 2015.  The persistence of poverty 
in families is evident, with 32.6 million of the 43.1 million people in poverty nationally being 
members of an impoverished family unit (Proctor, Semega, & Kollar, 2016).  The means-tested 
federal program that addresses child and family poverty is Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF), a welfare program that provides cash and food support grants to families as 
long as the parents are working or engaged in activities that lead to work.  TANF has supported 
fewer poor families with children than its predecessor, Aid for Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC); when TANF was enacted in 1996, it was being provided to 68% of families with 
children in poverty; now, only 23% of families with children in poverty are receiving TANF 
(Center on Budget and Policy Priorities [CBPP], 2016).  In every state, TANF benefits provide 
income that is less than half of the federal poverty line; in 16 states, TANF benefits are less than 
20 percent of the poverty line (CBPP, 2016). 
TANF.  TANF is a federal program that was devolved to states for implementation and 
operation.  TANF’s funding is distributed in block grants to states, and each state implements its 
own programming and policy to meet federal requirements (CBPP, 2015).  A portion of the 
federal funding is allocated to bureaucratic operations at the state, county and contractor levels, 
and a portion is distributed to families who demonstrate financial need.  Minnesota’s TANF 
program is called the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP); this study will be 
conducted caseworkers in MFIP, but the analysis and literature review will be grounded in MFIP 
CASEWORKER DISCRETION AND MFIP SANCTIONS 2 
 
as an iteration of TANF, and thus incorporate other TANF programs.  In MFIP, as in the federal 
TANF regulations, self-sufficiency through employment is the goal dictated to clients 
(Department of Human Services [DHS], 2016).  Within this paper, the term “client” refers to the 
adult caregiver in a family receiving MFIP; MFIP caregivers are most frequently the parent of 
the child or children but can also be blood relatives of some kind or whoever has custody over 
the children.  Caregivers must develop an employment plan and work with employment services 
as a condition of receiving cash assistance.  Clients are paired with employment service 
caseworkers (often called “career counselors” or “employment counselors”) who work with 
clients to create documented agreements about employment-targeted activities clients will 
engage in.  Frequently, however, the situations that place families in poverty cannot be alleviated 
by simple, employment-targeted activities.  If clients are experiencing hardship such as domestic 
violence, housing instability or symptoms of mental illness, they can get some flexibility on 
requirements within MFIP.  Often, concrete documentation must be submitted to qualify for this 
“good cause for noncompliance,” and the matter is largely up to the “professional judgment” of 
the caseworker.  Caseworkers are instructed to “request formal verification…if the good cause 
claim is questionable or if using good cause claims becomes a pattern” (DHS, 2015, § 14.6).  
Because “it is the participant’s responsibility to offer ‘good cause’ reasons for failure to 
comply,” if shame, stigma, the insidious effects of mental illness, or poorly crafted caseworker 
rapport counteract the client’s ability to disclose hardship, caseworkers may never know clients 
had good cause during instances of noncompliance (DHS, 2015, § 14.6). 
Poverty and mental illness.  The positive association of poverty with mental illness has 
been documented for decades; as mothers and children embodied more of the American poor 
population in the 1980s, mental illness became an increasingly relevant issue to poor families 
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(Belle, 1990).  A 2003 study indicates that poverty is a social cause of conduct disorder and 
oppositional disorder, and that anxiety and depression are also evidenced in high rates among 
poor families (Costello, Compton & Keeler, 2003).  Current research focuses on how the 
persistent association of poverty with toxic stress has intergenerational impacts on children and 
parents in poverty (Center on the Developing Child, 2016).  The prevalence of mental illness, 
toxic stress and trauma among poor families underscores the importance of screening and 
intervention within the TANF system in order to meet the goal of benefitting families and 
supporting self-sufficiency. 
Problems screening for mental illness.  Although caseworkers are advised to screen for 
mental illness or other debilitating challenges clients and families may face, screening 
procedures for mental health conditions that involve shame and stigma can be doubly ineffective 
within client-caseworker relationships that are not supportive or flexible.  Caseworkers are 
instructed to conduct full-fledged psychosocial assessments soon after meeting clients, which 
may result in distrust from clients who could get triggered or retraumatized by private or 
invasive subject material (DHS, 2009).  Clients are initially expected to develop a trusting 
relationship with caseworkers who have large amounts of private information on them, and 
whom they have never met.  Furthermore, despite the fact that assessment measures delve into 
delicate areas of family functionality, mental health, chemical use history, abuse and neglect, 
caseworkers are frequently not required to have any training in mental health or social work 
(DHS, 2009).  If a trusting client-caseworker relationship is not created in these adverse 
conditions, clients may be more apt to drop out of contact with their caseworkers when they are 
in one of the various crises that can characterize life in poverty.  Times of crisis are also 
precisely the juncture where support and reciprocity would be best, and where rapport with 
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county-contracted workers is most tenuous.  Caseworkers are instructed to interpret non-
responsiveness to outreach attempts as noncompliance (DHS, 2015).  This interpretive process 
could establish a practice that fails to acknowledge the complex effects of mental health 
symptomology and the debilitating nature of true crises for individuals who have been in 
consistent poverty.  Clients are expected to provide evidence of “good cause for noncompliance” 
when they do not follow the agreed-upon activity engagement (DHS, 2015, § 14.6).  Clients who 
are not forthcoming with documentation may be misunderstood by caseworkers during crises, 
rather than receiving the support caseworkers are ostensibly there to provide. 
Social cost.  When caseworkers do not understand the nature of crises clients are 
experiencing, or the crises are not adequately documented, caseworkers are instructed to send a 
warning letter about a financial sanction.  If no response is received, caseworkers are instructed 
to apply financial sanction to the client’s MFIP case, which reduces the client’s monthly income 
by 10 – 30 percent (DHS, 2015).  The social cost of being financially sanctioned for 
noncompliance can be that poor families are pushed deeper into poverty instead of accessing 
needed services and becoming more stable.  As caregivers are deprived of resources needed to 
stabilize their families at times when their functionality is already decreased, children experience 
higher rates of adverse childhood experiences, which has been associated with decreased 
functioning in their future adult lives (Center on the Developing Child, 2016).  Because the 
“primary mission of the social work profession is to enhance human well-being and help meet 
the basic human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs and empowerment of 
people who are vulnerable, oppressed, and living in poverty,” this issue is of paramount 
relevance to social workers in practice, and to social work research (NASW, 1999).  For 
prevalence data on sanctions in Twin Cities counties, see Table 1 in the Literature Review.  
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Human well-being is not enhanced when poor families’ sole, meager and often already-
insufficient MFIP income is cut.  Individuals who are caregivers and have survived the traumas 
of poverty themselves are vulnerable, especially if they are currently struggling with mental 
illness.  The children of such caregivers are vulnerable, not only because of factors associated 
with their caregivers but also because families on MFIP have an increased incidence of 
numerous barriers to development and functionality (DHS, 2008a).  Single parents with two 
children receive $532 in cash per month, and are expected to afford rent across municipalities 
that vary widely in cost of living; they are then expected to pay for all superfluous costs of job-
seeking and caregiving, with simple instructions to get to work.  MFIP families are categorically 
living in poverty, with the combined food and cash support received by a 2-member family 
($991) falling below 60% of the federal poverty guideline.  When the family’s income surpasses 
76% of the federal poverty line, they are no longer eligible for cash assistance (DHS, 2016).  
This means that families are never lifted above the poverty line by MFIP, and underscores the 
fact that financial sanctions are not merely a slap on the wrist, but a legitimately destabilizing 
event for a family in poverty.   
Social work’s response.  Concerned and responsive social workers ought to focus on the 
call to social justice and the importance of human relationships to develop more person-centered 
responses to the problem.  Social work researchers can play a role in suggesting program 
improvements that are strengths-based and support recovery and social services to improve 
holistic family functioning.  Social workers are most likely to work with clients in mental health 
settings who have had experience on TANF; awareness of the difficulties pertinent to that 
systematic experience would contribute to experiential knowledge of clients.  Social workers 
make up 60% of the mental health professionals in the nation, meaning they may encounter 
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issues related to the intersection between mental illness and TANF, as well as the way sanctions 
affect clients’ mental health (NASW, 2016).  Social work researchers can examine the decision-
making processes of TANF caseworkers to isolate hidden trends and biases and supply advocacy 
efforts with data and direction. 
The purpose of this study is to explore how caseworkers make decisions when clients are 
in noncompliance.  The significance of this question is defined by the harms of sanctions on 
already poor and unstable families.  Qualitative exploratory interviews will be conducted with 
MFIP caseworkers in the Twin Cities metro area, from various agencies and programs.  The 
interviews will be based upon the research question: What factors impact the decision-making of 
caseworkers around the question of noncompliance? 
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Literature Review 
This review of current literature will examine the state of social science research into 
TANF and mental health, as well as TANF sanctions and their effect on mental health and 
material hardship.  The goal of the present research is to unite these two areas of inquiry. 
Employment Services and Sanctions 
Employment Services is the employment counseling program managed and operated by 
the Minnesota DHS for MFIP.  Participation in Employment Services is mandatory for 
caregivers in MFIP family units, and the rules are largely in line with federal TANF regulations.  
DHS states that caseworkers “ensure that parents participate in work activities—including job 
searches—and help address barriers to employment.  Parents must take almost any job offer” 
(DHS, 2016a).  Mandatory participation is enforced through sanctions that cut 10 percent from 
family grants “in the first month and 30 percent [is] cut in the second through sixth months if the 
individual does not start complying with work rules. After six months of reduced benefits and 
continued failure to comply with work rules, assistance ends” (DHS, 2016a).  Sanctions are 
enforceable for many reasons, including not attending initial Employment Services overview or 
intake meetings, and not working closely with a caseworker on an Employment Plan (DHS, 
2015).   
Employment Plans.  DHS defines the first function of an employment plan as 
“Identif[ying] the participant’s self-support and employment goals, break[ing] those goals into 
smaller objectives, and list[ing] the steps the participant must take to achieve the goals in the 
shortest time reasonably possible” (DHS, 2015).  Helping clients with action planning and 
offering discrete steps toward otherwise lofty and overwhelming goals may be of assistance in 
addressing issues and helping clients move toward self-sufficiency, but there is distinctly non-
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negotiable language in the function description.  Employment Plans also function “as a tool for 
determining participant progress and compliance with the expectations of MFIP Employment 
Services,” as well as delineating “the parameters that are used to determine non-compliance” 
(DHS, 2015).  Although DHS indicates that clients’ goals are the cornerstone of the Employment 
Plan, clients are considered noncompliant if they do not sign a plan.  If the client does not agree 
to the terms of the plan or does not want to sign the plan because they do not see the 
caseworker’s suggested plan as achievable, they may still be held as non-compliant.  
Employment Plans are described in various places as a contract or an agreement between a client 
and a caseworker, but if clients do not agree with caseworkers on whether they can follow a plan, 
they are susceptible to financial sanctions on their monthly income. 
Documentation requirements.  Paperwork and documentation define the requirements 
for clients, the actions available to caseworkers, and the nature of the caseworker-client 
relationship in ways beyond the Employment Plan.  Clients must submit documentation monthly 
(or more frequently, depending on the terms of the plan) in order to verify their engagement in 
plan activities (DHS, 2015).  Clients are frequently given a form called an Activity Log, which 
features a table to list what jobs they have applied for or what activities they have engaged in, 
but display little information about skill development or less tangible networking or professional 
development.  Because the Employment Services system interfaces monthly with financial 
systems controlling client benefits, deadlines are firm and clients can be susceptible to sanctions 
if they are a day late on paperwork.  Clients are eligible for flexibility through one of two 
processes: Family Stabilization Services (see “State Program: Family Stabilization services on 
page 24) and good cause.  However, these processes are defined by paperwork and 
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documentation as well, which may present further challenges for individuals with low literacy, 
cognitive challenges, or aversion to county paperwork. 
 
Rates of sanctions.  During the 3 months of November 2016, December 2016 and 
January 2017 which lead up to the interviews for this study, sanctions in Hennepin and Ramsey 
counties (the core Twin Cities metro counties) were in effect at a rate of between 2.8 and 3.8 
sanctions per 100 MFIP cases (DHS, 2017a; DHS, 2017b; DHS, 2017c).   
 January 
2017 
January 
2017 rate 
December 
2016 
December 
2016 rate 
November 
2016 
November 
2016 rate 
Hennepin 
County 
Total 
cases 
6598  
 
6620  
 
6652  
Hennepin 
County 
sanctions 
242 3.6678% 248 3.7462% 210 3.1569% 
Ramsey 
County 
total cases 
4282  4284  4261  
Ramsey 
County 
sanctions 
147 3.4330% 121 2.8245% 131 3.0744% 
Total 
cases 
 
10880  10904  10913  
Total 
sanctions 
389 3.5754% 369 3.3841% 341 3.1247% 
Table 1.  Sanctions in effect in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties, November 2016 – January 2017 
 
Table 1 illustrates that on average more than 3% of residents per month in Hennepin or Ramsey 
counties were in sanction.  The overall average rate of sanction between the two counties within 
the three months displayed is 3.3612%, and sanctions affected between 300 and 400 families 
each month.  Sanctions remove between 10% and 30% of the overall grant, and after a certain 
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number of sanctions (depending on several parameters), a client’s case is closed.  When cases are 
closed due to sanction limit, clients must re-apply in order to receive benefits again, which may 
or may not be held back based on required documentation related to the original sanction (DHS, 
n.d.) 
The ostensible purpose of a sanction is to ensure client compliance with requirements to 
seek work and to comply with child support departments (DHS, 2002).  However, when real 
people with discretion are making decisions to sanction, many sanctions are imposed 
erroneously, haphazardly or for minor violations (Casey, 2010).  Clients who wind up in sanction 
often are not empowered to advocate for themselves.  Protective regulations including pre-
sanction conciliation processes were present in the previous iteration of the program, Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, yet are not included at the federal level of TANF 
implementation (Wu, Cancian, Meyer & Wallace, 2006).  Although MFIP includes a dispute 
resolution procedure for sanctions clients deem undeserved, it is de-emphasized and accessible 
only in reaction to receiving a warning or a sanction, rather than beforehand.  Furthermore, states 
often have no incentive to question patterns of sanctioning; the block grant structure for 
distribution of federal funds means that states benefit from imposing sanctions because liquid 
funds are freed when they are not granted to families (Casey, 2010). 
Sanctions destabilize families economically and mentally.  Social science literature 
demonstrates the real hardship sanctions bring to TANF families, including increased likelihood 
of hunger, eviction, homelessness, and difficulty accessing medical and mental health services 
(Casey, 2010).  Caregivers from families forcibly removed from TANF due to time limits or 
sanctions reported higher levels of food and housing hardships, and clients whose cases closed 
due to repeated sanctions were unable to obtain Medicaid, meaning they were unable to access 
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medical or mental health care (Lindhorst & Mancoske, 2006).  Although literature has 
demonstrated that compassionate regard from a caseworker helps clients to develop their 
wellbeing and agency (Sullivan, 2005), sanctions may punctuate client-caseworker relationships 
that are adversarial in nature.  As such, sanctions can be the endpoint in a relationship that 
prioritizes simplistic demands to work and discourages openness, help-seeking and emotional 
self-awareness.   
The mental harms of an adversarial relationship with a caring professional can extend 
beyond the material condition created by the punishment.  Causal connections have been posited 
between sanctioning and the experiences of housing insecurity, food insecurity, poor health and 
medical access, and excessive reliance on social and family connections for material support 
(Curtis, Reichman & Teitler, 2005).  Although sanctions are applied by caseworkers interpreting 
the behavior and choices of caregiving adults, they have impacts on the education outcomes of 
children.  A study of 67,015 children on MFIP indicates that disruptions to school enrollment are 
more common when at least one sanction is imposed on a family (.548 mean disruptions) than 
when no sanction had been imposed (.495 mean disruptions) (Larson, Lewis & Singh, 2011).  
This could mean that events leading to the imposition of sanctions are the same events that lead 
to disruptions in school enrollment; it could also indicate that sanction imposition leads to 
disruptions in school enrollment.  TANF sanctions have also been shown to have serious 
developmental ramifications on preschool-age children in the afflicted family, including 
decreased cognition and higher rates of behavioral issues (Lohman, Pittman, Coley & Chase-
Lansdale, 2004).  Rather than encouraging work and compliance, sanctions harm families and 
children long-term. 
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Sanctions contribute to economic disadvantage.  Contrary to the stated intent of 
encouraging job search and self-reliance, sanctions have been correlated with longer-term and 
more steady reliance on TANF funding, particularly when applied repeatedly (Fording, Schram 
& Soss, 2013).  Sanctions may not help stabilize clients or families; rather, they have been 
associated with reduced economic viability. A longitudinal study of 13,171 TANF clients in 
Wisconsin indicated that imposition of a severe sanction (50-91% reduction of cash grant) made 
families 23% more likely to leave TANF without a job, and families that received full sanctions 
(over 90% of cash) were 47% more likely to leave TANF with a lower earnings job (Wu, 2007).  
Sanction rates in Minnesota are more moderate: the first month a client is in sanction, 10% of the 
total grant (food plus cash) is removed from the cash portion.  For the following five months of 
continuous or interrupted sanction, 30% of benefits are removed from the cash portion, and 
unless clients demonstrate special eligibility at the seventh sanction imposition, MFIP clients are 
cut off from the program (DHS, n.d.).  In addition to immediate ramifications (such as eviction) 
of cash grant reduction, the Wisconsin study demonstrates that sanctions worsen the economic 
prospects of families for years after their imposition. 
High Prevalence of Mental Illness in TANF Population 
General TANF and single mother statistics.  Research into common characteristics 
among the TANF population has demonstrated a high prevalence of mental illness.  One 
longitudinal study of 632 TANF clients revealed that one-third had psychiatric diagnoses, and 
one-fifth experienced severe psychiatric functional impairments.  The same study correlated the 
persistence of mental health problems for more than two years with decreased rates of 
employment and income, meaning that both short-term and long-term incidence of mental illness 
among TANF clients have negative effects on economic stability and caregiving potential 
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(Chandler, Goodwin, Jordan, Meisel & Rienzi, 2005).  Other researchers have documented a 
high prevalence of mental health disorders among single mothers, and linked this to a decreased 
likelihood for working.  A longitudinal study of 753 urban TANF clients in Michigan found that 
the most common barrier to employment was a diagnosis of major depression, PTSD or general 
anxiety within the last year, presenting in 28.5% of the sample (Anderson, Danziger & Kalil, 
2000).  Single motherhood, in addition to TANF receipt, has been correlated with diagnosed 
mental illness and decreased economic viability.  Jayakody and Stauffer demonstrated that DSM-
III-R diagnoses were disproportionately represented among a national sample of 4,423 single 
mothers (2000). The same study contends that the likelihood of employment is 25% lower for 
mothers with a mental health diagnosis.  In a study of 489 female consumers of mental health 
services, 119 of whom were on TANF and 370 of whom were not, TANF clients displayed 
higher rates of serious mental illness than non-TANF clients (Stromwall, 2001).  Within the 
same sample, female mental health consumers participating in TANF have also reported 
significantly higher levels of mental health-related distress and dysfunction than women in 
mental health services who did not receive TANF (Stromwall, 2002).   
Local data and vulnerability to crises.  Local data on MFIP clients reflects similar 
trends in the prevalence of mental illness.  A five-year longitudinal study conducted with 843 
MFIP clients revealed a 34 percent rate of serious mental health diagnoses and a 17 percent rate 
of substance use disorder diagnoses (DHS, 2008b).  MFIP clients who have successfully 
transitioned to stable, post-MFIP living conditions were less likely to have a serious mental 
health diagnosis; mental health had a more direct correlation to long-term instability than did 
rates of incarceration or substance use issues (DHS, 2008a).  This local data should be 
contextualized with findings that TANF involvement correlates to increased vulnerability to 
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crisis.  One study of parents found that past or current participation in TANF programming has 
been correlated with increased psychological distress, decreased employability, and decreased 
physical health (Cheng, 2007).  Mental health problems among TANF clients are associated with 
decreased compliance with employment requirements, increased vulnerability to family crises 
and increased rate of sanction-related case closure (Chandler, Goodwin, Jordan, Meisel & 
Rienzi, 2005).  The lives of caregivers with severe mental illness are punctuated by crises that 
destabilize their families and make employment difficult to acquire and sustain. 
Diagnoses correlate with other barriers to self-sufficiency.  In TANF policy, self-
sufficiency and employment are nearly synonymous.  In other words, “success” in TANF means 
getting a job and getting off the program (CBPP, 2015).  One thing that can be obscured in this 
simplistic ideology is the relation between mental illness, well-being and situational stability as 
baseline conditions from which to approach employment.  Depression, anxiety disorders and 
other mental illnesses have symptoms that are exacerbated in crisis (Lindenthal, Myers, 
Ostrander & Pepper, 1972).  These symptoms also perpetuate insidiously and provide 
background interference with goal-setting, self-esteem and outward presentation, all critical 
elements of success in finding and maintaining employment.  In a study of 284 long-term TANF 
clients in a southwestern state, symptoms of depression occurred at a rate of 50 percent and 
frequently co-occurred with other mental or physical health problems, family violence, chemical 
abuse, or child behavioral challenges, creating debilitating intersections of psychosocial stressors 
and challenges that often preclude employment (Barusch &Taylor, 2004).  Other studies have 
found that the likelihood of employment is 25% lower for mothers with a mental health 
diagnosis, and that depression has a persistent negative correlation with employability (Jayakody 
& Stauffer 2000; Boston & Vaughn, 2010).  Studies have shown that psychological wellbeing 
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among TANF clients is not correlated with TANF exit rates, but that psychological wellbeing is 
correlated to gaining and maintaining jobs that pay more than minimum wage (Bodenschatz, 
Larrison, Nackerud, Risler & Sullivan, 2004; Sullivan, 2005).  Leaving MFIP can be associated 
with increased earnings, but it can also be associated with being sanctioned or disqualified for 
other bureaucratic reasons that can be related to mental illness.  This means that leaving MFIP is 
not an objective measure of the success of the program, because families who are leaving MFIP 
are not always better off.  Mental health problems have been shown to reduce likelihood for 
employment in the TANF population, and those with mental health diagnoses who do work on 
TANF work less hours and earn lower wages than those who do not have mental illness 
(Chandler et al., 2005).  A six-year panel study of 1,225 current and former TANF recipients in 
Illinois examined independent variables of human capital (as defined by education, experience 
and skills), depression, and mental health services, and their effect on the dependent variable of 
employment (Altenbernd, Bong & Lewis, 2006). The study indicates that depression with 
moderate severity and recurrence is positively correlated with employment challenges (r= .57, 
significant at .05 level) and that low human capital and severe depression is a combination that is 
particularly difficult to overcome.  Treatment and recovery engagement is complicated by the 
fact that symptoms frequently go unnoticed by clients and misattributed by caseworkers. 
Caseworker discretion 
Caseworker role.  Individuals in poverty display a high incidence of mental illness and 
often face disproportionate psychosocial challenges (Barusch et al., 2004; Lewis et al., 2006).  
The caseworker matched with a client is the human being that represents the county, state, and 
federal governments, who is tasked to place demands on the client to pursue self-sufficiency 
(DHS, 2015).  Caseworkers are also tasked with fielding requests and concerns from clients, and 
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instructed to help provide resources to help stabilize families and move clients into work.  
Despite carrying out work with clients that is akin to general practice social work, job openings 
for MFIP case managers often require only an unspecified post-secondary degree to demonstrate 
basic competency (MN Council of Nonprofits, 2017).  Caseworkers are likely the bureaucrats 
whom clients see most frequently, and despite the inherent power dynamic and non-voluntary 
nature of the relationship, clients may come to place trust in caseworkers.  Caseworkers have a 
certain amount of discretion and choice, and caseworkers are instructed to use person-centered 
interactional techniques such as Motivational Interviewing that encourage openness, honesty, 
and progress (DHS, 2015).  Because clients encounter caseworkers regularly, they have 
opportunities to disclose a diagnosis of mental illness or the symptoms that characterize mental 
illnesses to their caseworkers.  The trust created in the client-caseworker relationship makes it a 
critical juncture of screening and intervention for client mental illness.  As a meaningful 
touchpoint between the government and caregivers in poverty, the nature of the relationship 
between caseworkers and clients (punitive or supportive) is also a vital criterion for how well 
MFIP is truly meeting the needs of the most economically disadvantaged families. 
The relationship between caseworker and client defines the MFIP service rendered to the 
client; because caseworkers interpret policy and deal directly with clients who are on the 
program, it is their actions that bring policy to life.  The caseworker-client relationship can be 
conceived of as an embodiment of government aid; although caseworkers do not issue cash or 
food grants to clients, they are supposed to use the relationship they have with clients to help 
them move to self-sufficiency.  Soss, Fording and Schram point out (2011) that the caseworker 
relationship includes substantial therapeutic elements, especially in the ways that the client 
conceptualizes the relationship.  The ways that the caseworker relates to the client can define the 
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ways the caseworker interprets the policies that constrict their behavior.  Social work is built on 
the idea that relationships are primary to social change, personal healing and family 
functionality; as such, social work as a profession ought to be concerned with the quality of 
relationships between caseworkers and clients (National Association of Social Workers 
[NASW], 1999).  Social workers are bound by professional ethics to support self-sufficiency and 
holistic functioning of individuals, families and groups.  Social work as a profession orients itself 
toward those who are poor and vulnerable, which warrants extra attention and advocacy around 
policy and service issues in government programs such as TANF that affect intergenerational 
family functioning.  Because single mothers and poor caregivers in general are systematically 
disempowered, social work ethics draw focus to TANF policy and the ways that bureaucratic 
systems constrain the capacity of the caseworker-client relationship (NASW, 1999). 
Generally, TANF caseworkers are not trained to conceptualize their interactions with 
clients as constitutive components in a relationship.  However, the quality and nature of these 
interactions provide structure for the activities of supported goal-setting for self-sufficiency, and 
resource referral and follow-up.  Caseworkers are trained to recognize the complexity of the 
problems that clients face, but are also taught to consistently redirect clients to the primary goal 
of getting a job (DHS, 2015).  Caseworkers adopting the role of employment coach may not be 
able to as readily create the trust with clients that can be vital to disclosing symptoms of mental 
illness.   
Clients may already have issues with recognizing and disclosing mental illness, resulting 
from perceptions of stigma, symptoms such as self-isolation and shame, patterns of abuse, or 
lack of psychoeducation about dysfunctional symptomology (Larson, Wester & Vogel, 2007; 
Evans-Lacko, Henderson & Thornicroft, 2013).  These disclosure issues are compounded and 
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shaped by the work-first ideology of MFIP, which also imports the concepts of write-ups and pay 
cuts from the employment world (Soss et al., 2011).  Clients who are not following through with 
their employment plan and have not disclosed good cause for non-compliance are subject to a 
written warning called a Notice of Intent to Sanction, (NOITS) (DHS, 2016b).  Soss, Fording 
and Schram compare contracts such as the employment plan to work contracts, and warnings 
such as the NOITS to writeups at work (2011).  If evidence of compliance or good cause is not 
provided after the NOITS is issued, a subsequent removal of a portion of their cash grant 
(financial sanction) is advised (DHS, 2015).  If a punitive dynamic is established, it may not be 
conducive to clients disclosing their struggles.  The imposition of sanctions can topple already-
precarious rapport and erode the strongest service linkage between the government and clients 
(Casey, 2010).  The material harms of sanctions can have an impact on clients’ mental health; if 
the imposition of a sanction drives clients away from caseworkers, cycles of sanctions can 
compound stress and worsen client mental health. 
Caseworkers are trained to provide resources to families.  TANF caseworkers 
maintain complex and shifting identities that involve balancing expectations from employers and 
governments with challenging demands and situations brought by the public.  The case 
management niche involves therapeutic aspects as well as bureaucratic elements, creating 
competing and often contradictory sets of behaviors and thought (Soss et al., 2011).  
Caseworkers are often situationally unable to muster the resources or time necessary to address 
client issues fully or work on complex psychosocial issues with clients at the requisite depth.  
Caseworker job descriptions often require no training in mental health or social work, some 
specifying only a BA in human services (MN Council of Nonprofits, 2017).  Although they are 
placed into situations with decisions that may seem to call for a social work or psychology 
CASEWORKER DISCRETION AND MFIP SANCTIONS 19 
 
professional, caseworkers often make up for a lack of training or expertise by using the scant 
amount of discretion that is given to them.  “They use their discretion mainly to ration time and 
resources, offer small favors, control their caseloads, and make decisions about whom to 
penalize or ‘cut some slack’” (Soss et al., 2011, p. 233).  Nonetheless, discretion is a key 
component of street-level bureaucracies such as those in the TANF system, and caseworkers are 
positioned to use their discretion to benefit families by offering extra time, leniency, or referrals.  
The discretion of a TANF caseworker is also exercised in decisions to apply sanctions or provide 
leniency to certain clients.  Often a simple casenote that mental health issues are suspected is 
enough to ward off the necessity of a financial sanction for a month.  Caseworkers are also 
instructed to provide positive and negative incentives to keep clients on the desired path from 
welfare dependency to working parenthood (Soss et al. 2011).  The extent to which caseworker 
beliefs, backgrounds, experiences, decision-making and behaviors in relation to clients are 
interrelated has not been extensively explored in social science literature on TANF. 
Street-level bureaucracy and caseworkers sanctioning clients.  Street-level 
bureaucracies are institutions through which the government provides for the public, and wherein 
the activities of the workers are constrained by numerous policies and rules. Michael Lipsky, 
who coined the term street-level bureaucracy, frames the use of discretion in the presence of 
constraints: “At best, street-level bureaucrats invent benign modes of mass processing that more 
or less permit them to deal with the public fairly, appropriately, and successfully.  At worst, they 
give in to favoritism, stereotyping, and routinizing” (Lipsky, 2010, p. xii).  Discretion can be a 
tool used professionally by street-level bureaucrats to ensure the maximum benefit is delivered to 
the public, from a pool of restricted resources.  However, TANF policies also include 
discretionary instances of punishment, through financial sanctions.  Decisions to apply a sanction 
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are instances where policy is being interpreted by a specific caseworker and applied to produce 
adverse material effects in the lives of families (Soss et al., 2011).  Despite the ostensibly 
objective criteria for when to apply a sanction, client situations are always ambiguous; the 
caseworker’s evaluation of the client reduces their experience of ambiguity and eases the 
resultant decision, whether consciously or subliminally (Soss et al., 2011).  One study revealed 
that implicit racial bias constricts the decision-making of welfare caseworkers in Florida and 
results in more people of color being sanctioned (Soss et al., 2011).  In this way, the power of 
stereotypes and modes of mass processing among TANF street-level bureaucrats have been 
documented.  However, the factors affecting the decision to apply a sanction in cases where non-
compliant client behavior may be indicative of mental illness have not been examined 
specifically. 
Caseworker decision-making.  Research has demonstrated that the ways people think 
about other people who have mental illness affect the way that they treat those people.  Corrigan, 
Kubiak, Markowitz, Rowan, and Watson examined the responses of college students to persons 
with mental illness, finding that mental illness that is perceived as controllable in onset will more 
likely result in avoidance, withholding of assistance, and coercive treatment (2003).  Perception 
of danger from the person with mental illness is also a significant predictor of avoidance and 
coercion.  These findings indicate that blaming persons with mental illness for their situation or 
believing that they are flawed to the core can increase the likelihood that they will receive 
punishment.  If the trend documented with college students may be translated to TANF 
caseworkers, any perception that the behaviors, symptoms or situations associated with mental 
illness is the result of bad choices or poor judgment could result in avoidance, assistance 
withholding and coercive treatment.  When TANF case managers discuss their specific cases, 
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“their accounts pivot time and again on moral assessments of what specific clients did, whether 
they were exerting sufficient effort, and whether they appeared to be trustworthy in explaining 
their actions” (Soss, et al., 2011, p. 249).  The tendency towards negative judgment of those who 
display symptoms impairs the decision-making of TANF caseworkers in situations of potential 
mental illness. 
Client disclosure issues.  Disclosure of symptoms associated with mental illness is 
frequently complicated by socialization and trust issues.  A team of researchers examined mental 
health service use and issues affecting client pursuit of services and disclosure of symptoms, 
finding that global rates of treatment among those with diagnosed mental illness are less than 30 
percent.  Major factors decreasing service use and treatment engagement include lack of 
psychoeducation about symptoms, lack of connectivity to treatment systems, and perceived or 
experienced prejudice against people with mental illness (Evans-Lacko, Henderson & 
Thomicroft, 2013).  Larson, Vogel and Wester examined mental health literature for barriers to 
seeking psychological health, summarizing that avoidance factors included social stigma, fears 
of therapy, fear of emotionality, perception that risks involved with therapy outweigh the 
benefits, and reluctance toward deep self-disclosure (2007).  The barriers to accessing mental 
health services are numerous, but are compounded by the dilemmas that clients face when 
accessing a street-level bureaucracy.  Lipsky argues that non-voluntary clients of street-level 
bureaucracies “must strike a balance between asserting their rights as citizens and accepting the 
obligations public agencies seek to place upon them as clients” (2010, p. xiv).  In other words, 
the sterner a caseworker is about pursuing strictly employment-related activities as a condition of 
receiving assistance from MFIP, the more likely clients are to prioritize the perceived obligation 
of finding work over the right to access medical or mental health services.  This can create long-
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term instabilities in mental health that further decrease the likelihood of self-sufficiency through 
meaningful and sufficiently lucrative employment. 
Service Solutions in Alternate Models 
Relationship-based casework.  Research has indicated that when caseworkers display 
concern and interest for their clients, and work collaboratively with the client to address issues, 
clients display less psychological stress overall.  In a study of 2,402 female clients, caseworker 
support had a regression coefficient of -.058 (p < .01), indicating that as caseworker support 
increases, psychological distress among clients decreases (Cain & Hill, 2012).  Delving into the 
complex issues in the lives of clients can help caseworkers to identify and assist with the 
complex issues resulting from intersections of learning problems and mental illness (Leukefeld, 
Otis & Wahler, 2015).  A qualitative longitudinal study of 21 TANF recipients presented stories 
reinforcing the need for in-depth, rapport-based case assessment for mental health and family 
issues (Bussey & East, 2007).  The authors of a study of 632 TANF clients in California 
advocated for the review of mental health status prior to sanction imposition to preserve client 
mental health and functionality (Chandler et al., 2005).  Caseworkers may have greater success 
with clients if they adopt culturally-specific approaches and engage in screening and assessment 
at a depth of interaction that fits with the complexity of client histories and comorbidities (Hines 
& Lee, 2014).  Research has also indicated that from an occupational therapy perspective, TANF 
mothers with diagnosed mental illness need leisure activities, home management skills and self-
care regimens more than they need to be rushed into employment (Good, McNulty & Stanger, 
2012). 
Structural changes at state and agency levels.  Considering the multiplex personal 
challenges that TANF clients face, social policy researchers have called on state departments and 
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service agencies to become more flexible with work requirements and more realistic about the 
pace that clients can be pushed into work (Bussey & East, 2007).  One study suggested allocating 
funding to create mental health-specific TANF services that circumvent the work-first ideology 
of TANF in favor of holistic recovery services (Chandler et al., 2005).  Another study advocated 
increased service coordination between TANF service providers and mental health providers 
(Cheng, 2007).  Focusing on baseline functioning and preventive mental health care would 
augment the employability of TANF clients, which places an emphasis on forming more 
connections between the broader systems of public welfare and mental health in government 
planning (Cheng, 2007; Stromwall, 2001).  Literature has also pointed out that cross-training 
between the disciplines of psychiatry, social work and public service would help to avoid time-
wasting punitive procedures and to establish realistic system approaches to accomplish better 
work outcomes; to embrace this at a national level could produce benefits for TANF clients in all 
states. (Marrone, 2005).  One salient agency-level service recommendation is a tiered service 
structure that includes mental health screening after TANF intake, but before assignment to a 
work plan service track.  This approach would involve screening at various points in the client’s 
engagement with TANF, as well as supported work efforts, intensive or integrated case 
management, and short-term solution focused interventions (Lee, 2005).  This service 
recommendation augments recommendations to target integrative, culturally-specific services to 
the real issues that MFIP clients face, rather than an idealized client-as-worker model (Lee & 
Hines, 2014).  Improving service structures with well-rounded screening measures and practical, 
family-centric referrals would be a step towards addressing the real needs of families rather than 
pushing clients into employment that may not be sustainable. 
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State program: Family Stabilization Services.  Family Stabilization Services [FSS] is a 
service track that was created during the 2007 Minnesota state legislative session.  FSS is a 
service model that circumvents some of the rigidity of conventional MFIP employment services, 
because “FSS participants are not included in the TANF work participation rate calculation 
giving counties more flexibility to develop appropriate plans” (DHS, 2007, p. 3).  FSS gives 
caseworkers opportunities for increased flexibility with clients, and the option to pursue 
“individualized treatment & effective and meaningful opportunities” with clients (DHS, 2007, 
p.5).  FSS eligibility criteria must be verified by documentation and includes medically verifiable 
conditions such as physical ailments or injuries to the client or someone in their household, 
mental and chemical health diagnoses, developmental delay, or low IQ.  FSS also includes 
categories of social or familial challenges including newly arrived refugee or immigrant status, 
family violence and general unemployability (DHS, 2015).  FSS is a significant part of the local 
service culture, with the distinction between FSS largely defining the importance paperwork 
plays in the caseworker-client relationship.  When clients are not in the FSS track and are still 
counting towards the work participation rate, caseworkers are heavily incentivized to focus on 
paperwork in meetings and when contacting clients.  Caseworkers are not under as much 
pressure to get FSS clients to comply because they do not fall into the work participation rate, a 
metric often valued by supervisors, agencies, counties and the federal government.  Because FSS 
funding is state-provided, caseworkers do not have to focus as much on employment-related 
outcomes, which can be helpful when working with clients who have disabilities (DHS, 2007). 
Local example of alternate service structure.  One program active in the Twin Cities 
has gained national recognition for its innovation and results.  Families Achieving Success 
Today (FAST) is “a co-located partnership of several agencies to provide mental health, 
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vocational rehabilitation, health care, and employment services to TANF recipients with 
disabilities” (Akers, Berk, Derr, McCay, Mecksroth & Resch, 2015).  FAST implemented 
evidence-based practices including motivational interviewing and the IPS supported employment 
model to provide extra autonomy and support to clients (Baird, Barden, Farell, Fishman, & 
Pardoe, 2013).  The project was first implemented as a pilot program in a study involving 389 
TANF clients who were assigned to FAST (the treatment group) or to regular employment 
service providers (the control group).  By tracking state and county metrics on families and 
conducting qualitative interviews and site visits with staff, researchers found that client earnings 
increased relative to those in standard employment services, as did the general rate of 
participation in work activities (Mecksroth, et al., 2015).  Employment was increased in two of 
four quarters and earnings were increased in all four quarters (Farrell, et al., 2013).  FAST 
displayed substantial outcomes that are not attained in the lesser-funded and more simplistic 
standard set of employment services, providing a salient example of how better-funded and more 
targeted TANF services can assist families more effectively. 
Gap in Literature 
This researcher was unable to find exploratory or qualitative research on how 
caseworkers decide whether to sanction a client when the client is exhibiting behavior that could 
be explained by mental illness.  Academic search engines used were Social Work Abstracts, 
SocINDEX, and PsycINFO; search terms included TANF, mental illness, non-compliance, 
financial sanctions, and street level bureaucracy.  The social work librarian at the St. Thomas 
University library was consulted multiple times throughout the process of reviewing the 
literature to confirm that there is a gap in the literature regarding this caseworker decision-
making process. 
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Summary 
Social science research has identified the prevalence of mental illness within the 
population that receives or has received TANF (Chandler et al., 2005; Danziger et al., 2000; 
Stromwall, 2001).  Research has also demonstrated the harms that punitive financial sanctions 
bring to families and researchers have called for substantial change to the ways that clients are 
assessed and cases are reviewed prior to sanction imposition (Fording et al., 2013; Larson et al., 
2011; Reichman et al., 2005).    The present research will contribute to the goal of filling that gap 
and exploring why caseworkers think how they do regarding noncompliance; suggestions will be 
made about what can be done to maximize client benefit and minimize client harm. 
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Conceptual Framework: Street-Level Bureaucracy and Ecological Model 
Street-Level Bureaucracy 
Street-level bureaucracies, as originally described by Michael Lipsky (2010), are 
institutions where government services are provided to the public.  Structural features that define 
street-level bureaucracies include a dearth of resources and high caseloads, which restricts the 
activity and options available to street-level bureaucrats.  This framework has been applied to 
research on the criminal justice system, the welfare system (including TANF but also child and 
adult protection and other types of monetary assistance), and gerontological service systems.  
Soss, Fording and Schram (2011) have used the framework to examine how TANF caseworkers 
in Florida make decisions, and have isolated the effects of implicit racial bias on the 
discretionary choices caseworkers make to sanction clients.  The framework applies to MFIP 
caseworkers because they are given policy to guide the actions they take with clients, but this 
policy is intentionally open to interpretation and applied with discretion, which enables uneven 
application of rewards, favors, referrals and punishments.  The following concepts were used 
from the street-level bureaucracy framework to guide the direction of this research and the 
creation of the interview schedule. 
Street-level bureaucracy defined.  Bureaucracies are characterized by regimented 
documentation standards for human interactions, numeric goals, and hierarchical power 
oversight.  Lipsky identifies street-level bureaucracies as the institutions where government 
policy is interpreted and enacted to provide a service to the public.  Contradictions exist between 
the bureaucratic structure of these institutions and the chaotic and endlessly variable nature of the 
lives of clients in poverty; because of this, street-level bureaucrats are given discretion to 
interpret the rules in ways that fit client situations.  Discretion means that caseworkers as 
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individual people make decisions that affect clients.  These decisions become more important 
than the letter of the law: “the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, 
and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the 
public policies they carry out” (2010, xii).  Although caseworkers often enter the field as 
idealistic servants with a goal to help clients change their lives, the contradictions within street-
level bureaucracies “prevent them from coming even close to the ideal conception of their 
jobs…adjusting their work habits and attitudes to reflect lower expectations for themselves, their 
clients, and the potential of public policy” (2010, xii).  Lipsky asserts that these lower 
expectations are a natural consequence of operating under pressure in a street-level bureaucracy 
(2010). 
TANF caseworkers are street-level bureaucrats by the nature of their job function.  There 
is tension between the outcomes they track and the complexity of client lives; they interpret 
policy that intentionally includes a degree of discretion; and their caseloads are so large that they 
must adopt some type of mass processing method.  TANF service structures are defined by the 
quantitative outcomes they seek to achieve.  States, for instance, calculate the percentage of 
clients who are documenting a certain number of hours in activities related to employment per 
month.  Because the federal government partially assesses states’ needs and efficacy based on 
this proportion, paperwork and computer systems are designed and used around it (Galindre, 
2012). 
Discretionary choice and decisions.  Street-level bureaucracies are categorically 
overloaded.  Because of this, policy is constructed that can be applied in numerous ways and for 
numerous purposes.  Caseworkers are given discretion about when to apply punitive or incentive 
measures to clients’ cases.  The street-level bureaucracy framework recognizes that the 
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discretionary choices available to caseworkers, and the decisions they make with those options, 
are more significant to the client’s experience of the policy than are the particulars of the policy 
itself.  In other words, what the client experiences (the service rendered) is the sum of the 
decisions the caseworker makes with the discretion they have been given.  In TANF, 
caseworkers have discretion over the amount of time they spend assessing clients, whether they 
respond to clients’ demands or return phone calls, the intensity with which they seek appropriate 
services and referrals for clients, and when and how to apply punitive measures such as financial 
sanctions.  If caseworkers advocate to their supervisors or managers on behalf of clients, they 
may be able to stave off the necessity of applying a sanction for one or more months.  On the 
other hand, if caseworkers apply a sanction and don’t discuss it with their supervisor, the validity 
or necessity of the sanction may not be questioned. 
Coping strategies.  Caseworkers often enter the job with intentions to serve the public 
and make a difference in people’s lives.  They can be put into situations that realistically demand 
a social worker or psychologist.  Caseworkers do not have the time that social workers spend 
with their clients, nor do they have the clinical skills of screening, intervention and diagnosis that 
would contribute more meaningfully to psychosocial family interventions (Soss et al., 2011).  
Frequently, caseworker positions only require a bachelor’s degree in generic human services 
(Minnesota Council of Nonprofits, 2017).  When they must reckon with the stark realities of high 
caseloads and the harsh events that punctuate clients’ lives, caseworkers engage in multiple 
coping strategies.  Caseworkers can fall back on implicit biases and categorizations of clients to 
speed up assessment and justify decisions made in haste.  When information about previous 
conduct within the program or previous mental health diagnoses is available, it may contribute to 
judgments caseworkers make about clients before meeting them and the resultant patterns of 
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rapport-building and goal-making.  This could reduce caseworkers’ ability or tendency to make 
assessments of the clients’ present condition, attitude and situation.  Caseworkers may also 
salvage what they can of their self-identity as social servants and competent workers by 
selectively applying higher standards of service to a portion of their caseload, often not realizing 
they have segmented their caseload and altered their treatment of it.  This has been demonstrated 
with race in TANF, and the present research examines how beliefs caseworkers hold about 
causes for noncompliance affect discretionary choices among caseworkers (Soss et al., 2011). 
Ecological Model 
The ecological model of human behavior and development, first described by 
Bronfenbrenner, describes overlapping systems of influence, reciprocity, and discord in human 
lives (Bronfenbrenner, 1994).  These systems include the micro setting in which development 
and behavior occurs (home, workplace, neighborhood); the meso system of connections between 
various immediate settings; and the macro system, forces acting at cultural, governmental and 
ideological levels (Forte, 2007).  Human behavior, such as caseworker decision-making, can be 
understood by explanations and causal relationships at each level of the ecological model.  This 
multi-level analysis augments street level bureaucracy’s inherent focus on the micro setting and 
the meso system, and provides terminology for factors influencing behaviors on different scales.  
Within this paper, references to personal factors correlate to micro factors; agency level factors 
correlate with meso system factors; and macro factors frequently involve broader community 
events or discursive ideas. 
Application to street-level bureaucracy framework.  The factors affecting discretion 
and decision-making in street-level bureaucracy often transcend the micro, meso and macro 
levels.  On the micro level, personal and interpersonal factors influence decision-making and 
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coping strategies.  Among these are personal biases and attitudes about clients, life events, and 
variable work stress tolerance levels. Agency policies and supervisor relationships define the 
choices available to caseworkers at the meso level.  The effects of middle management culture 
and decisions about policy implementation often constrain, but sometimes expand, the flexibility 
and choices available to caseworkers in the environment of the street-level bureaucracy.  
Applying the ecological model to street-level bureaucracy illuminates how factors at the meso 
level, within the bureaucracy, interact with personal factors as well as macro forces.  At the 
macro level, TANF policies and the national discourse on welfare mothers and mental illness 
contributes to the ways that caseworkers think as well as the policy that guides states and 
agencies.  Caseworkers were asked to parse out the influences on their decision-making at these 
levels. 
  
CASEWORKER DISCRETION AND MFIP SANCTIONS 32 
 
Methodology 
Research Question 
What factors impact the decision-making of MFIP caseworkers around the question of 
noncompliance? 
Research Design 
 Literature examining sanctioning in TANF is prolific and uses secondary data analysis, 
primary quantitative data analysis, and summative qualitative data analysis (Casey, 2010; Bussey 
& East, 2007; Fording et al., 2007; Fording et al., 2013; Larson et al., 2011).  Studies to 
understand thought processes and discretionary patterns among TANF caseworkers often 
incorporate interviews and focus groups (Soss et al., 2011; Taylor, 2013).  Research on the 
prevalence of mental health challenges within the TANF population uses primary quantitative 
research, primary qualitative research, or secondary data analysis (Chandler et al., 2005; Hill et 
al., 2012; Jayakody et al., 2000; Marrone, 2005; Stromwall, 2001). 
 Qualitative methods help to clarify the interior workings of topics that have been 
minimally researched (Padgett, 2008).  The decision-making of welfare caseworkers around the 
issues of sanctioning and mental health has not been examined directly in social work research.  
This study expands on current literature by bringing together the concepts of sanctioning and 
mental health, from the perspective of the caseworker.  Research subjects were caseworkers who 
were involved with sanction decision-making, and who had developed relationships with clients.  
Interviews were conducted about when and how sanctions are applied, but the interviews also 
prompted caseworkers to discuss their personal methods for screening clients for mental illness 
or acute short-term crises, and whether there were sufficient screening tools in place from the 
state, county or agency caseworkers were affiliated with.  This exploration was into “a topic of 
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sensitivity and emotional depth” (Padgett 2008, p.15), the nuances of which translate best 
through qualitative research.  Qualitative research is also a way to bring more meaning and life 
to the quantitative outcomes and program evaluations that abound in governmental reporting on 
TANF.  Qualitative research can illuminate hidden processes and practices in programs (Padgett, 
2008); the current research brings light to caseworker discretion and the range of motions 
granted to caseworkers through MFIP policy, adding to a body of research addressing the on-the-
ground efficacy of TANF and MFIP programming. 
 Interviews were the chosen qualitative method for the present research because they are 
personal, expansive, and fluid.  When looking at the choices available to caseworkers and the 
way they come to decisions, stories and extrapolation provide the most meaningful qualitative 
data.  Rather than adhere precisely to a timed and limited interview schedule, the interviewer 
gave respondents the ability to elaborate during interviews to provide more emotional and 
ideological content.  For the full interview schedule including all questions, see Appendix A. 
Sample  
Employment service professionals contacted by committee members were asked to 
participate in the snowball sampling method to recruit more respondents.  Ten respondents were 
interviewed; all were employment service caseworkers who develop employment plans with 
clients and had the ability to sanction clients’ financial cases.  Respondents had at least five 
months of experience on the job and came from any educational or training background, but they 
all managed client cases and sanctions.  Educational background was tracked, and used for 
demographic analysis.  The professionals were from the Twin Cities metro region in Minnesota, 
and worked in one of the Twin Cities metro counties.  The goal was to interview willing 
respondents from multiple agencies and from multiple service areas, to access a more universal 
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experience of working in employment services, rather than being clouded by agency- or 
community-specific procedures or trends. 
Data Collection 
Data collection occurred during 40-80 minute 1:1 interviews conducted by the researcher 
in person with employment service professionals.  Recruitment steps before interviews began: 
1. Committee members emailed known employment service professionals in county and 
nonprofit settings to distribute the recruitment protocol: 
You are invited to participate in a research study on decision-making in 
employment services.  The study is being conducted by Andrew Kishel, an MSW 
student from the St Catherine/St Thomas social work program.  Part of the MSW 
program is to conduct an original research project that examines local issues, 
practices or policies.  Andrew is conducting research on factors that affect 
decision making in situations of participant noncompliance.  He would like to 
interview you and other employment service professionals 1:1, for 45-60 minutes, 
and then debrief for 5 minutes.  The research is entirely voluntary and you will be 
able to withdraw at any point; when it is completed, it may contribute to a body of 
literature on MFIP practices and policies. 
 
If you are interested in participating in this research and completing an interview, 
please contact me to authorize passing your information along, or contact Andrew 
Kishel directly by text, phone or email at 651-470-8342 
(Andrew.kishel@stthomas.edu). 
 
2. All respondents contacted the researcher by email, and interviews were arranged by 
email or text message.   
3. A total of ten interviews were conducted.  Four interviews were conducted with 
respondents from the first direct inquiries sent by committee members.  After the 
informed consent process, the interviewer explained the snowball sampling method to 
respondents, and asked for assistance recruiting other respondents. These four 
respondents were asked to recruit other respondents.   
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4. Through these snowball contacts, the protocol was spread to all the employment 
service providers in Hennepin County, and to the members of an employment 
services advisory group at the Minnesota Department of Human Services.   
5. Six more respondents contacted the researcher based on snowball recruitment from 
the four initial contacts made by committee members; these six completed interviews 
as well.  Because contacts were made person by person and across agencies and 
counties, written approval from agencies was not requested; however, respondents 
were encouraged to check with their supervisor if they typically require approval for 
one-hour meetings. 
 
Transcription and Data Analysis 
 Interviews were digitally recorded, and then transcribed with the use of transcription 
software called MAX-QDA.  Responses in the transcription were coded in MAX-QDA based on 
content themes; the codes were then sorted into categories.  MAX-QDA allowed for quick recall 
of all quotes within categories from across different transcripts.  Themes and categories were 
analyzed and contrasted, using the concepts within street-level bureaucracy and the ecological 
model that are delineated in the conceptual framework (Padgett, 2008).  The questions were 
exploratory and asked about factors in client noncompliance as well as factors in caseworker 
decision-making.  Data analysis examined commonalities and contradictions in caseworkers’ 
decision-making processes and the factors they identified. 
Data analysis was guided by the responses themselves, using the Grounded Theory 
method.  Grounded Theory enables a researcher to include “theoretical ideas and concepts 
without permitting them to drive or constrain the study’s emergent findings” (Padgett 2008, p. 
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32).  Although street-level bureaucracy was the conceptual framework, using Grounded Theory 
to guide analysis reduced the level of bias present in the study because it rooted the conceptual 
themes in the interview content itself.  Recorded interviews were transcribed, and then 
transcripts were analyzed using a process of open coding to inductively determine patterns in 
responses.  Street-level bureaucracy and the ecological model provided sensitizing concepts that 
provided a direction for the analysis, but preserved the inductive validity of the open coding 
method (Padgett, 2008). 
Informed Consent and Human Rights 
The human rights of the respondents were protected by the design of the questions and by 
the respondents’ participation in the informed consent process.  The questions were professional 
in nature, and sought to address the decision-making processes of the respondent by examining 
tools and methods that are available to them due to policy and program design.  The respondents 
were adequately informed of risks to them and to their privacy as a part of the informed consent 
process, and interview transcripts and analyses were kept confidential and de-identified.  Among 
risks to respondents was the possibility that somehow information on caseworker decision-
making reaches their supervisor, so confidentiality was highlighted during the informed consent 
process.  The respondents’ participation in the survey was voluntary at all points, and they were 
informed of their right to withdraw or skip questions.  Respondents reviewed the consent form in 
Appendix B with the interviewer, and were given a chance to withdraw before the interview 
begins.  Records of the consent forms were stored in a separate location from the transcripts and 
audio recordings, and audio recordings will be destroyed by May 1, 2019. 
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Interview Schedule 
 The interview schedule was developed in consultation with the research committee to 
explore caseworker thought processes during situations of client noncompliance.  Current policy 
guidance was verified by consulting the MFIP/DWP Employment Services Manual as provided 
by the Minnesota Department of Human Services, and supplemental materials and reports from 
DHS.  The concept of discretion in street-level bureaucracy was applied to TANF by Soss, 
Fording and Schram (2011); the interview schedule was structured to query caseworker 
discretion and the individual, organizational, and societal factors involved in decision-making.  
Interview questions were reviewed by the research committee and the St. Catherine University 
Institutional Review Board to reduce bias.  Respondents who asked for the interview questions 
prior to the interview were provided them by email.  Demographics tracked included years in the 
employment services field, race, gender, and educational background.  For the full demographics 
sheet, see Appendix C. 
Researcher Bias 
 The researcher had substantial bias in that he spent five years working with MFIP clients, 
two of which were as an employment services caseworker.  The strength of this experience as 
applied to the present research is that the researcher understood the internal structure and 
operations of MFIP employment services in multiple Twin Cities Metro counties.  This 
researcher also had experience working with MFIP clients and families, from within the MFIP 
system as well as from within the nonprofit mental health system.  The researcher’s depth of 
experience with caregivers and families who receive MFIP was an advantage in that lived 
anecdotal experience supports the research on multiplex psychosocial functional deficits that 
confront clients on MFIP. 
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The researcher’s experience with MFIP systems and clients also created inherent 
limitations due to bias.  It was difficult at times for the researcher to maintain objectivity.  
Although the research is structured to be exploratory and the use of grounded theory ties the 
analysis to the data itself, the researcher was wary of using lines of questioning that lead the 
respondent to particular responses.  Bias was addressed in consultation with the research 
committee.  The research committee reviewed the interview schedule, sampling procedures, and 
spread of respondents, to reduce the effect of researcher bias on the exploratory qualitative 
research process.  The committee also reviewed the research proposal and was requested to pay 
attention to researcher bias at all points in the proposal.  Adherence to Grounded Theory during 
data analysis helped to avoid bias in the discussion and implications. 
  
CASEWORKER DISCRETION AND MFIP SANCTIONS 39 
 
Findings 
Sample 
Ten respondents were interviewed for this sample.  All 10 respondents worked with 
MFIP clients in the Twin Cities metro area at one of many agencies that contract with Twin 
Cities counties to provide employment services, or directly for one of those counties.  Two of the 
respondents (20%) were male and eight (80%) were female.  Three respondents (30%) held 
management positions where they also interacted with clients; the other seven (70%) had various 
titles but their primary job was casework with clients.  All respondents are described herein as 
respondents to protect their privacy.  Respondents had an average work experience of 99.8 
months or 8 years, 3.8 months; to protect respondent privacy, range of work experience are not 
reported.  Seven respondents (70%) reported they had a Bachelor’s degree, one (10%) reported a 
master’s degree, one (10%) reported an associate’s degree, and one (10%) did not answer the 
educational demographic question.  Five respondents (50%) reported they had additional 
certifications of use in their work.  Three respondents (30%) reported that they work with clients 
in the general MFIP population, while seven (70%) reported that they worked in programs 
catered to specific populations such as refugee groups, FSS clients, or young parents. 
Recruitment was cut off on March 3, 2017.  Response rate for the study cannot be 
ascertained because it is unknown how many people the recruitment protocol reached.   
The first interview occurred on February 2, 2017, and the last of the ten total interviews occurred 
on March 10, 2017.  Interviews lasted between 31 and 80 minutes. 
Themes 
Multiple themes emerged from the transcripts.  The conceptual framework provided 
sensitizing concepts including street-level bureaucracy, discretion, lower expectations, and 
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coping strategies, and the literature review was conducted on issues surrounding sanctions and 
mental health.  However, adherence to Grounded Theory during the coding process meant that 
emergent themes included concepts and categories of meaning not included in the conceptual 
framework or the literature review.  Themes are identified by the subheadings in this section, 
while concepts within those themes are identified within the text underneath subheadings.  If six 
or more respondents mentioned something, it was considered a theme.  Within themes, concepts 
are defined by being mentioned by at least four respondents, or because they contrasted with or 
contradicted the overarching theme.  Some respondents made comments that seemed to 
contradict each other (for example, some caseworkers identified themselves as being both 
compassionate towards clients and suspicious of them).  Direct quotes from study respondents 
will be italicized, indented and cited with respondent number and line number from the 
transcript. 
Caseworker Role 
Caseworkers were asked to describe their role in their job, with the question: “what is 
your role in your position?”  Responses fell into categories of job functions and affective or 
cognitive stances caseworkers held. 
Caseworker functions.  All ten respondents (100%) mentioned that paperwork was a 
part of their job, and seven (70%) indicated that they help clients fill out paperwork or resolve 
bureaucratic errors.  One respondent described how much time is spent on case closure and 
mistakes from the county:  
I think most of my job every day is to manage peoples' cases, make sure that their 
daycare is straight so that they can work, or look for work, that their check stubs are in, 
for FSS clients if their social service attendance sheets are in, and just yea, casenote 
interactions. I feel like the least part of my job is helping the person actually find a job.  
(Respondent 5, line 4) 
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Seven respondents (70%) spoke of formal processes of assessing clients or monitoring client 
progress.  Six respondents (60%) talked about how planning documents such as state-mandated 
Employment Plans or county-mandated Goal Action Plans were a central part of their role.  Six 
respondents (60%) indicated that supporting clients’ engagement in educational activities is 
important in their role.  Six respondents (60%) described referring clients to services in the 
community or at the county as part of their job.  Five respondents (50%) described advocacy on 
behalf of clients or encouraging civic engagement among clients to be a substantial part of their 
role.  Four respondents (40%) indicated that visits to clients’ homes or employer sites were a part 
of their outreach process; all four of these respondents were caseworkers for specialized 
programs.   
Caseworker stances.  When asked the same question about job roles, caseworkers also 
spoke about the stances they have towards clients, whether cognitively or affectively.  These 
stances were sorted into three main categories: caseworker was oriented mainly toward treating 
the client well or not worsening their situation (“client-considerate”); caseworker was focused on 
resolving problems in client’s life (“problem-oriented”); and caseworker adopted a punitive or 
suspicious attitude about clients (“client-suspicious”). 
Client-considerate stance.  All ten respondents (100%) described an orientation toward 
treating the client well or not worsening their situation.  One respondent stated: 
It's sometimes tough for some clients, so we always try to work it out, not sanction right 
away, try to find a way you know build a relationship with the client, not just like judge 
right away, why is client not coming, what's going on, try to work with the client work it 
out, call the client, leave a message, try to call again.  I'm the kind of person I don't 
sanction people.  I always work it out.  (Respondent 10, lines 24-25) 
 
Nine respondents (90%) described their role with clients as a non-punitive “therapist,” “mentor,” 
“counselor,” “hand-holder,” or a part of their clients’ “support systems.”  Nine respondents 
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(90%) described their stance toward clients as compassionate, flexible or beneficent, or that they 
had a moral or ethical duty to be supportive and non-punitive to clients.   
Problem-oriented stance.  Eight out of ten respondents (80%) described their stance in 
the caseworker dynamic to be problem-oriented.  One respondent describes the types of 
problems that can be addressed in the context of MFIP services: 
It's not easy when you don't have a plan.  So we talk about that, we try not to focus so 
much on like the work participation rate, even though we have to.  But really just seeing 
if there's anything that we can do to, if there's things that are getting in the way of their 
employment, if there's anything that we could do to support them, if they are FSS eligible, 
if there is some like mental health that's undiagnosed.  (Respondent 4, line 16) 
 
Problems that caseworkers described addressing with clients included addressing barriers to self-
sufficiency in a broad sense (n=7, 70%), working creatively within the system to help clients 
address bureaucratic and practical challenges (n=6, 60%), or instilling self-sufficiency as a goal 
(n=5, 50%). 
Client-suspicious stance.  Six of ten respondents (60%) described a punitive orientation 
toward clients, an attitude of blaming clients for their situation, or an approach to the job that 
included distrust of clients.  One respondent described a type of attitude present among 
caseworkers: 
I have had the opportunity…to see that there is a dynamic that gets set up, an “us against 
them” scenario, and that…depending on agency culture and the individual factors of the 
employment counselor that there is a significant issue with counselors using the 
noncompliance and then viewing punishment or sanctions as a, I wouldn't say enjoyable, 
but…over time having less compassion and empathy for clients.  Then as the us versus 
them kinda grows then the noncompliance, also much quicker to sanction, or based on 
agency culture, the NOITS are written in really shaming language, where it's very clear 
that this is meant to be threatening.  (Respondent 6, line 103) 
 
Four respondents (40%) spoke of the concept of “tough love,” referred to their clients as 
“children,” or referred to themselves as “babysitters.”  Three respondents (30%) indicated that 
part of ensuring client compliance involves investigating their lives behind their back, at times 
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before meeting the client.  Three respondents (30%) indicated that an “us-vs-them” dynamic can 
be present in relationships between clients and county-contracted caseworkers. 
 
Expectations of Caseworker Role 
Caseworkers were asked to compare their initial expectations of their roles with their 
current understandings of their roles, with the question: “Is your role different than the role you 
thought you would have when you took the position?  (If yes, how so?)”  Responses that were 
more descriptive of the role as it is currently were grouped into the first interview question about 
Caseworker Role.  Themes identified included bureaucratic factors that were unexpected, and 
components of the role that were expected and held true. 
Unexpected bureaucratic factors.  Six of ten respondents (60%) described unexpected 
aspects of their role that fell into the category of bureaucratic factors or operations.  Five 
respondents (50%) indicated that their role involved more cases, more duties, or a wider and 
increasing set of responsibilities than they were expecting.  One respondent pointed out that 
already-overburdened caseworkers are sometimes put into situations they are not qualified for: 
More responsibility, you know I feel like as years go on we're handed more and more 
things as employment counselors where 1, we don't have the capacity to take on much 
more, and 2, I don't necessarily feel like people are trained in a lot of these areas where 
it makes me feel uncomfortable sometimes having the experience that I do, but I also see 
it with my staff, where they're asking, you know, feeling uncomfortable, especially the 
FSS cases.  (Respondent 8, line 18). 
 
Four respondents (40%) described how it was unexpected that the MFIP system is more about 
rules, case closures or paperwork than it is about getting clients to work or impacting client lives.  
One respondent described tension between rules and discretion as being inherent in street-level 
bureaucracy: 
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I feel like MFIP welfare programs are very structured and objective.  And I think part of 
the reason for that is because it is on such a large scale, that there has to be a pretty 
structured program in order to define results, right, cause everything needs to be studied, 
everything needs to be proven, we need to see results or not. 
 
That's where on a smaller scale, it is I think much easier to connect with people and make 
those decisions based on your discretion and your supervisor and your local community 
of course because of what's going on but on a larger scale, there has to be the NOITS 
process, there has to be the race against time, there has to be the rules and regulations 
that are put in place so that the program can run.  and because there's a disconnect, 
because I don't know people who are making those decisions, I don' t have a direct 
influence on how these decisions are swayed or being made, that makes it tougher to 
make your own decisions based on the rules and regulations that are already put in 
place.  (Respondent 4, lines 125-127) 
 
This understanding emerged after this respondent transferred from a conventional caseworker 
role to a specialized and more flexible caseworker role.  Comparing programs within MFIP can 
shed light on the ability to build relationships and work effectively with clients within normal 
MFIP service conditions. 
Expected components of role.  Eight respondents (80%) had expectations about the 
bureaucratic facets of the caseworker role that were met or that fell into line with what they 
eventually understood their role to be.  Among these expectations was the notable amount of 
paperwork involved with the role (n=6, 60%).  One respondent described how they were 
prepared for significant paperwork but that it has reached new proportions: 
Once I started, I remember thinking this is going to be a lot of hard work, lot of 
documentation, lot of paperwork, I guess when I went into it I thought I would have more 
of an impact on peoples' lives, it became more pushing paper and trying to keep up with 
paperwork.  And that, even now more so, it's gotten even more like that. I'd say over the 
years it has increased.  (Respondent 8, line 14-15) 
 
Three out of ten respondents (30%) reported they had accurate expectations for the role because 
they were either raised on AFDC (n=2, 20%) or they have participated in MFIP (n=1, 10%).   
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Factors in Client Non-Compliance 
Caseworkers were asked about factors that lead clients to be in non-compliance with 
employment services.  The two questions in the interview about these factors were: “What are 
the factors that lead to clients not complying with Employment Services?” and “Have you 
noticed any themes that are common to families with caregivers who are not in compliance with 
employment services?” 
Bureaucratic factors in non-compliance.  Nine out of 10 (90%) respondents mentioned 
a cause of sanction that could be categorized as a bureaucratic factor.  One respondent described 
the centrality of paperwork and participation requirements: 
Basically the rules state that everyone in the program has to be doing 35 hours per week 
of some type of activity, whether it's full or part time work, participation in school or job 
search, volunteering is also allowed.  Those are kind of the allowable activities, and as 
an employment counselor, usually weekly or every other week you're checking the 
progress of all the people on your caseload to make sure that they're maintaining that 35 
hours per week.  So the compliance piece comes in here if someone is falling behind or 
someone doesn't turn in anything, [doesn’t] have contact with you, that's when you're 
sending out what's called a notice of intent to sanction…  (Respondent 4, lines 33-38) 
 
Six respondents (60%) mentioned how employment plans are the defining criteria for 
compliance, or how a focus on the Work Participation Rate or a limited set of activities can 
contribute to client disinvestment and resultant non-compliance.  Four respondents (40%) 
described the unappealing or unrealistic nature of employment services from a client perspective, 
or how personal disagreements caused by employment counselors were contributing factors in 
client non-compliance.  Four respondents (40%) mentioned that the MFIP grants are set at such a 
low amount that they seek to avoid sanctions as a result.  One respondent pointed out the 
insufficiency of MFIP grant size for paying rent in Twin Cities Metro counties:  
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They're surviving, which is damn hard to do on assistance, you don't get enough to 
survive.  You don't get enough to make rent, I honestly have never actually asked, I don't 
know how people survive on 500 a month, cash, I really don't.  (Respondent 2, line 208) 
 
Family or community factors in non-compliance.  Eight of ten respondents (80%) 
indicated that family or community factors can present challenges that lead to non-compliance.  
One respondent indicated environmental factors such as social support systems as a source of 
mental health issues and noncompliance:   
I think the biggest one would be mental health, and that could be tied to all types of 
different situations, I mean trauma is a big one, just thinking generational poverty, your 
environment, your social support system I think is probably the largest one.  (Respondent 
8, line 41) 
 
Four respondents (40%) mentioned intergenerational, familial poverty as a contributing factor to 
non-compliance through trauma, lack of access to opportunities or resources, or the fact that 
public assistance is not designed to end poverty.  Four respondents (40%) mentioned child 
incidents as factors contributing to non-compliance, including child behavior issues and the 
resultant work needed to resolve issues at school, children being victimized by violence at school 
or in the community, and issues related to teenage personality traits.  Seven respondents 
identified a variety of other family or community contributors to challenges maintaining 
compliance, including family violence (n=5, 50%), emergencies related to deaths or health 
challenges in the family or utility shutoffs (n=2, 20%), and the challenges of single parenting or 
dealing with an absent male parent (n=2, 20%). 
Transportation barrier.  Eight of ten respondents (80%) reported that low access to 
transportation is a major factor in clients’ situational ability to comply with employment 
services.  One respondent noted how difficult it is for clients to use an insufficient public transit 
system: 
There are also other problems, like transportation, if agency location is not really 
located on the bus line, or convenient location, and they during the wintertime, these 
CASEWORKER DISCRETION AND MFIP SANCTIONS 47 
 
people have to catch you know, 2, 3 buses to get to see employment counselor…and they 
will just give up, because they don't want to come and then counselor will just simply 
assume that you know these people don't want to come, without realizing how difficult it 
is for them then they say it's noncompliance… (Respondent 1, lines 63-66) 
 
In addition to unspecified transportation shortages (n=5, 50%), specific factors identified 
included unreliable vehicular transportation (n=3, 30%), lost or stolen bus cards (n=2, 20%), and 
caseworkers’ office locations not being on the bus line (n=1, 10%). 
Clients lacking skills.  Six respondents (60%) referred to clients lacking skills as a factor 
in non-compliance.  One respondent referred to the set of skills demanded by the program as 
“middle class” skills: 
They're not used to being responsible with their time, the concept of keeping a calendar 
and actually checking it a couple times a day and having the planning that it takes to get 
to all their appointments.  They have a hard time doing that especially if they're low IQ 
or struggling with mental illness or learning disability, it's almost impossible for them to 
function like a middle class person. Like, we would expect most people function as middle 
class people really.  (Respondent 9, lines 47-49) 
 
Six respondents (60%) referred to clients lacking concrete skills involved with bureaucratic 
compliance, such as “basic methods of organization” including the use of calendars and 
awareness of deadlines, technology skills or transferrable employment skills.  Four respondents 
(40%) referred to a lack of appropriate coping mechanisms for stress, a general internalized 
disempowerment, or situational emotional reactivity as contributors to non-compliant client 
behavior. 
Mental, chemical or physical health challenges.  Six respondents (60%) mentioned 
generalized mental or chemical health challenges or specific conditions such as anxiety, 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), chemical dependency or sleep problems.  One respondent 
described the interrelation of community violence with mental health disorders, and the resultant 
functional challenges: 
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People have a hard time with attendance, because of their own because of their 
disabilities...mental illness, because of their anxiety or some have Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder, some have agoraphobia they're afraid to even leave the house, some are afraid 
to go out in the neighborhood because…there's been increased shootings the last couple 
years and that's made it worse…some of them have severe anxiety at night, or sleep 
problems for different reasons, and they might not sleep very much, or they’re not used to 
getting up early in the morning, so they oversleep in the morning and often miss 
appointments… (Respondent 9, line 46). 
 
Six respondents (60%) referred to medical issues or physical impairments that prevent clients 
from complying fully with employment services.  One respondent described the commonality of 
hard-working ethic among those who are on MFIP because of physical infirmity: 
[Clients] are employed and then something happens like they find out they have some sort of 
disease or illness and they lose that ability work, and with that goes the ability to provide for 
their family.  And they want that back all the time.  I had a handful of male clients that got 
injured at work or something and they couldn't go back to the same job and they never, they 
never didn't stop thinking about just going back and working those kind of jobs again… they still 
did it for like weeks at a time until something happened and…they woke up and all of a sudden 
they couldn't get out of bed because their back hurt so bad because they hurt it at work or just 
exacerbated the problem.  (Respondent 2, lines 78-81) 
 
Cognitive or learning disabilities and literacy challenges.  Six respondents (60%) 
brought up functional challenges clients have with complying based on their level of literacy or 
cognitive diagnoses.  One respondent described how cognitive challenges can be one of many 
issues clients face that contribute to non-compliance, especially surrounding paperwork: 
If you don't have somebody that can kind of help you navigate through that paperwork, 
especially if you're a client that can't really handle filling it out on your own as much, 
that creates more stress. and the embarrassment of having a learning disability or mental 
illness or something else going on, and then never mind the other issues they're dealing 
with… (Respondent 9, lines 257-259) 
 
Four of these respondents (40%) referred to clients with low IQ, learning disabilities, traumatic 
brain injuries or lead poisoning as facing enhanced difficulty, and two (20%) referred to the 
specific challenges English Language Learners face with compliance. 
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Homelessness or unstable housing.  Six respondents (60%) spoke of housing instability 
or homelessness as stressful family situations that make compliance difficult.   
The biggest factor that I think is housing, whether they are officially homeless like they 
literally have nowhere to go, or they were couch hopping, they're staying with someone, 
and something happened and now they're not staying there.  It's not stable, or it's like 
drama, in pertaining to housing… just not being stable and not having a stable place to 
live tends to be one of the biggest reasons [for non-compliance] that I see.  (Respondent 
5, Lines 34-35) 
 
These six respondents (60%) referred to homelessness or housing instability in a general sense as 
a factor, and three (30%) referred specifically to issues receiving mail or keeping track of county 
paperwork in relation to housing instability. 
Child care shortage.  Five respondents (50%) identified lack of child care as a hindrance 
to compliance.  These five respondents (50%) spoke of general challenges accessing affordable 
and dependable child care providers, while three (30%) also spoke of inefficiencies and 
challenges accessing the Child Care Assistance Program designed to dovetail with MFIP and 
enable participation in employment services.  One respondent noted the interplay between issues 
with child care providers and time delays within the Child Care Assistance Program and its 
effect on their client: 
You're talking about noncompliance, I have a client, I didn't even know this but it took 
him forever to get daycare authorized.  I don't even know why but when I came in, I don't 
know what happened…I had a note that daycare still wasn't authorized after so many 
weeks.  Finally got authorized, his kid had "behavior problems" not sure, but within a 
couple days, his kid is told basically that he can't come back to daycare.  So he like 
basically shut down.  Didn't call me, was MIA for two months.  Finally resurfaces, tells 
me, and I'm just like wow, I can see why that makes him just go off the radar… 
(Respondent 5, line 170) 
 
Decisions to be Made in Response to Non-Compliance 
Caseworkers were asked about the decisions that they make in their role when a client is 
not in compliance with the interview questions, “What types of decisions do you have to make 
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when a client is not in compliance?” and “What happens when clients are not in compliance, and 
what is your role in what happens?” Responses were sorted into categories of leniency-related 
decisions, calendar- and timing-related decisions, and effort investiture. 
Leniency-related decisions.  Nine respondents (90%) spoke of decisions related to 
leniency on particular cases in non-compliance.  One respondent described how defining client 
behavior as noncompliance is a choice: 
Well, that's the first decision, are they actually in noncompliance?  Again there's these 
grey areas where yes you have to report changes within 10days, and so it does say that in 
the employment plan, but then how you may go about sanctioning them is not as clear-cut 
as, they're not working the number of hours, or they didn't turn in their job logs or 
whatever.  (Respondent 5, lines 38-39) 
 
Another respondent referred to leniency as a “downside:” 
A downside of mine is that I let them slack a bit, which they kind of appreciate, because 
we know that they have a lot going on, so if you're a month late on your paperwork, I'm 
not going to penalize you on it.  (Respondent 2, line 61) 
 
Two respondents described a decision of whether a client is to be considered “pre-FSS,” 
meaning the client can be granted the flexibility associated with FSS before their FSS 
documentation is received by the caseworker.  A major category of leniency-related decisions 
identified by respondents included good cause and pre-FSS determinations as well as 
determinations about general deservedness for leniency based on the perceived chaos in a 
client’s life (n=6, 60%).  Five respondents (50%) spoke of leniency-related decisions about 
following MFIP policy guidance around NOITS, home visits, and curing sanctions.  Three 
respondents (30%) reported that leniency decisions are related to factors external to the client 
such as the employer of the caseworker, the client’s documentation on file, and perceived 
immediate safety concerns.   
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Calendar- and timing-related decisions.  Seven respondents (70%) described decisions 
that are based on the financial workers’ calendar of sanction imposition deadlines, or on the 
timing of discretionary actions.  Financial workers are different than caseworkers in that they are 
the ones who handle the monetary side of the case and frequently have hundreds of clients.  One 
respondent referred to a “race against the clock” within their position as caseworker and 
explained the concept: 
It is [a race against the clock] on adult MFIP because there are monthly lists that need to 
be done within the month, and benefits are issued monthly, and so we're working with the 
county, we're working with child care, we're working with financial workers and we're 
the employment counselor, and so basically with the sanction process there's cutoff dates, 
and so if you're not sending something in by a certain time, someone's grant will or will 
not be sanctioned for the next month so it could be a month out it could be two months 
out, depending on when you send it in.  (Respondent 4, line 78) 
 
Four respondents (40%) referred to choices related to the Notice of Intent to Sanction (NOITS) 
and the request to impose a sanction, which involved cutoff dates for sanction imposition that 
could postpone a sanction for a month, how much of a variable amount of time to allow clients to 
come back into compliance, and how long to allow documentation of medical conditions to come 
in.  Two respondents (20%) talked about choices related to rescheduling meetings clients cancel. 
Effort investiture.  Five respondents (50%) spoke of how the amount of effort to invest 
contacting and working with clients flexibly is a choice itself—ie, caseworkers can decide to 
invest more effort into certain clients or to ignore other clients, based on subjective and 
unregulated criteria.  Caseworkers can decide how much work they want to put into contacting a 
client who is in sanction.  One caseworker described how much discretion is involved with this: 
The biggest decision at least for me is how proactive to be in trying to bring the client 
into compliance.  So, basically how hard am I working at doing the phone call to say, 
“hey your job log didn't get turned in,” or the email to do that kind of thing, so that 
would be my first decision, is how much am I going to put in here, and part of that would 
be an assessment too of what I think is going on.  (Respondent 6, line 44) 
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This caseworker stated that based on their assessment of what is “going on” with the client, they 
may put less effort into helping clients get sanctions cured and full cash grants restored.  Four 
respondents (40%) referred to rapport building, contact attempts and communication strategies as 
choices that are in the hands of caseworkers that enhance engagement and reduce the need for 
sanctions.  Four respondents (40%) indicated that the amount of time available to caseworkers to 
invest extra effort depends on bureaucratic limitations due to caseload size, program structure or 
agency policy. 
 
Factors in Decision-Making 
Respondents were asked several questions about factors that influenced their decision-
making, including influences and factors at the micro, meso, and macro levels, as well as what 
they perceived as alternatives to sanctions when making a decision in a situation of 
noncompliance. 
Personal factors.  Respondents were asked about personal factors that affect their 
decision-making with the question: “What about you as an individual person affects your 
decision-making in situations of client non-compliance?”  Nine of ten respondents (90%) 
identified themselves as generally compassionate, committed to being empathetic, or having a 
non-punitive orientation toward clients.  One respondent identified recent shifts in policies that 
have enabled increased flexibility and compassion: 
I tend to be more on a compassionate side I think than some people; some employees, 
some coworkers that I work with, and when [our] county gave us the OK to be lenient on 
things I was really glad that they did that, because when you come from a perspective of 
this is just another human being, not a number or a client, it really puts things into 
perspective of, it makes you feel pretty awful when you have to do these things that you 
don't really want to do.  (Respondent 2, line 97) 
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Seven respondents (70%) spoke of problems with the MFIP system such as the insufficiency of 
cash grant size and the punitive nature of the rules as factors leading towards increased leniency.  
One respondent identified reluctance to remove resources from children: 
I don't wanna be a person who is actually stopping their benefits, cause I really know 
they're financially depending on it, as well not just them also their children, dependents.  
(Respondent 10, line 42) 
 
Six respondents (60%) indicated that struggles they had experienced in their personal life led to 
them being more understanding, flexible or lenient with clients.  Four respondents (40%) 
referred to a sense of personal accountability in their own work or their professional reputation 
as factors that limit the flexibility they use.  Three respondents (30%) referred to their personal 
values from spirituality, family of origin or current community as factors in their response to 
client non-compliance. 
Agency-level factors.  Respondents were asked about the meso-level factors that affect 
their decision-making with the question: “What factors within your agency affect the way you 
make decisions—for example, supervisors, colleagues, or agency policies?”  Seven respondents 
(70%) referred to their ability to be flexible because of flexible supervisors or managers, or 
flexible aspects of program design such as the ability to do home visits or intentionally low 
caseload size.  One respondent pointed out their supervisors’ pursuit of meaningful services: 
I think the program, the agency I work with is great because my supervisor, she 
understands the situation of the people and she, it's not only our agency, the county level, 
[our] county especially, trying to modify MFIP services to focus more on program 
participant's needs, and then trying to minimize the need of the work participation rate 
and work in a meaningful--and that's exactly in line with our agency and all of these 
employees or counselors or supervisors think the same way too, especially in my position.  
(Respondent 1, line 135) 
 
Six respondents (60%) indicated that agency policies decrease leniency and increase sanctions, 
particularly in larger agencies or when incentives are not available.  Five respondents (50%) 
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spoke of how their county policies are intentionally non-punitive, vague or flexible, or referred to 
innovations their county made that reduced the need for reliance on sanctions as a tool.   
Macro-level factors.  Respondents were asked about the macro-level factors that affect 
their decision-making with the question: “What factors within your community affect the way 
you make decisions?”  Follow-up questions about discourse on welfare were asked as well.  Six 
respondents (60%) indicated that governmental administrations and public discourse on welfare 
affect the way that the system operates and the way they talk to clients about MFIP.  For 
example, one respondent described how political regimes play into their approach to casework 
and discussions with clients: 
I know that the one thing that we tend to in our office kinda battle with is I guess the ideal 
that people on welfare don't want to work, and that they're lazy, and then hearing 
especially with our current presidential administration, we're all scared in the office 
cause…this is what he talks about, cutting welfare…so that as workers makes us want to 
kinda make people more accountable.  And we tell them that, we're like you know we 
have this new president that their goal is to make this stuff disappear, so it really may not 
be here, like even if you had months left, it literally may not be here.  And that is such a 
scary feeling, because if it does, let's say in a year, see a drastic decrease, then what is 
that gonna be when people have been just not being able to hold down steady, viable 
employment?  (Respondent 5, lines 106-108) 
 
 Four respondents (40%) identified that welfare-critical mass media messages or political 
discourse does not affect the way that they make decisions about non-compliance, even if it does 
affect the way they talk to clients.  Three respondents (30%) identified dysfunction within the 
MFIP system, public transportation system, or police department as significant in decision-
making about non-compliance. 
Alternatives to sanctions.  Respondents were asked what alternatives were available to 
them if a sanction was not to be used in a situation of non-compliance with the question: “in 
what situations would you use alternatives to sanctions?”  Follow-up questions focused on what 
the alternatives were and why they pertained to situations. Seven respondents (70%) described 
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offering a medical opinion form to a client to produce documentation of impairment as an 
alternative to sanctions.  One respondent described the way that medical opinion forms quantize 
client capabilities: 
That's when the medical documentation would come into effect and these forms that are 
used are for pregnancy, physical conditions, mental conditions, and so that would be you 
know if you are seeing a primary doctor or a therapist or a counselor then they would 
assess your situation and say, “I think this person can't do anything right now or I think 
this person can do 10 hours per week instead of 35.”  (Respondent 4, line 172) 
 
The respondent drew emphasis to the number of hours clients can participate rather than the 
diagnosis or medical issue clients experience.  Five respondents (50%) spoke of increasing 
attempts to contact clients prior to imposing sanctions: four of these respondents (40% of the 
total sample) indicated that home visits are an aspect of their program that decreases the need to 
impose sanctions.  Home visits are not possible for all caseworkers to conduct due to the policies 
of their programs and agencies; however, those who are able to conduct them identified them as 
a viable alternative to sanctions.  Four respondents (40%) mentioned the use of incentives such 
as gas or bus cards, clothing assistance, and connections to community resources as a non-
punitive engagement tool; two of these (20% of total sample) mentioned that incentives allow the 
client to retain more dignity than a sanction does.  Three respondents (30%) said that they had 
not thought about whether there were alternatives to sanction, or that the only options are to give 
clients more time or “wipe the slate clean.” 
 
Screening 
Respondents were asked about their methods of screening in noncompliant situations 
with the question: “What do you screen for when determining whether to apply a sanction?”  
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Followup questions were about defining good cause and how that process works if respondents 
had identified that as a screening concern. 
Types of screening and frequency.  Six respondents (60%) spoke about how taking the 
time to be conversational and develop trust is a more accurate way to screen that results in the 
issuance of less Notice of Intent to Sanction (NOITS) or sanctions (DHS, 2016b).  One 
respondent compared a program they work in now, which has a smaller caseload size, with the 
more conventional approach to MFIP services: 
The facetime with people, [in my current program] I find myself communicating a lot 
more and giving a lot more time to people if I know that they're trying, and because I've 
been able to build a rapport, I get to see them more, I get to know what type of person 
they are, and whether or not they're really working hard, or they're saying “yup, I'll turn 
that in, I'll turn that in,” and I’m never going to see it…delving a little deeper to see is 
this more of an issue than you just not wanting to be somewhere.  and then if it is, more of 
something, then that can become the cause and effect of maybe someone has had a 
traumatic experience has lasting effects with that or something. (Respondent 4, lines 74-
75) 
 
Five respondents (50%) indicated that caseworkers can choose the extent to which they use 
screening tools such as self-screen assessments, verbal functional assessments, and medical 
opinion forms.  One respondent indicated that screening tools are designed to be implemented 
too early in the caseworker-client relationship, especially considering the potential history of 
noncompliance or NOITS: 
I could see how the [employability measure assessment tool] could be helpful if 
somebody was willing to, you know but at 90 days…I can't say that I would be 
comfortable answering all those questions with my case manager, who might have 
already sent a couple NOITS at this point. (Respondent 8, line 53) 
 
Four respondents (40%) indicated that the screening they perform involves querying information 
systems for documentation of homelessness, impairment, or good cause. 
Good cause.  Five respondents (50%) indicated either that it is the client’s responsibility 
to proactively demonstrate good cause, or that there is very little they can do if the client does 
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not communicate good cause to them.  Five respondents indicated that caseworkers should be 
screening for good cause, including causes such as a death in the family (n=4, 40%), previous or 
potential FSS eligibility (n=3, 30%), or materially adverse situations such as homelessness or 
lack of transportation (n=2, 20%). 
 
Trauma and Stress 
Respondents were asked about the impact of trauma and stress on the clients with the 
question: “To what extent do stress and trauma impact your clients?” 
Nine respondents (90%) mentioned specific functional difficulties related to trauma and 
stress that interfere with clients’ abilities to comply, such as decreased confidence or sense of 
self-efficacy, difficulty concentrating or hypervigilance, or erosion of coping skills into 
addiction, abuse or general disarray.  One respondent indicated that clients do not always 
disclose trauma, and that there can be an associated sense of hopelessness: 
A lot of my clients have experienced trauma.  Some can say it, and some we don't talk 
about it with them because they don't want to talk about it, but a lot of times I think a lot 
of our clients I think they don't believe that they can actually make it.  so why try?  
(Respondent 5, line 226) 
 
Seven respondents (70%) indicated that histories of trauma were very prevalent or nearly 
ubiquitous among MFIP clients.  One respondent stated that “every client, all the time” is 
affected by trauma; another stated “it affects most of my clients.”  Six respondents (60%) 
identified common causes of trauma, including childhood abuse or neglect, historical trauma or 
currently stressful living or parenting arrangements.  One respondent underscored the impact of 
growing up in intergenerational poverty: 
There's a ton of clients who have grown up in poverty and that is traumatic in and of 
itself, we know what happens with cortisol levels when you're growing up and da da da, 
so to have that child who is now an adult trying to participate in a program that expects 
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them to function as if that environment never existed, so I think that it's fairly rare that 
stress and trauma don't have a really significant impact on clients.  (Respondent 6, line 
101) 
 
Three respondents (30%) spoke of the unique issues refugees have faced in their past or the 
potentially retraumatizing nature of living in a completely new environment.  Three respondents 
(30%) specifically mentioned clients having difficulty coping with the financial stress associated 
with being in poverty and receiving a cash grant that is insufficient for urban living. 
 
Emergent Themes Involving Bureaucracy 
Numerous themes related to the bureaucratic elements of the caseworker position and 
MFIP emerged across the interview questions as well as in the final, open-ended question: “Is 
there any other information you think would be important for inclusion in the study?”   
Bureaucratic factors.  Five respondents (50%) described how program rules and service 
structures are designed with little awareness of the MFIP client population or not designed to lift 
people out of poverty.  One respondent described how the policies guiding MFIP services are 
conceived by people who have little understanding of the caseworker experience or the client 
experience: 
Well I think it, if the state has that type of policies I think definitely we need a channel 
that we need to not really have a top-down approach, we also need to have a bottom-up 
approach too…decisions to understand what is going on at the ground level and then 
make the policy that is in line with people on the ground, and that is how the purpose of 
the program is going to meet the needs of the people and then eventually we really are 
going to achieve the goal, but it has to be a win-win situation, the program design should 
not really coming from focus on the numbers, focus on the hours, without realizing that 
the real situation and theirs is totally different.  (Respondent 1, line 145) 
 
Five respondents (50%) spoke of a fundamental tension between leniency and punitive responses 
to noncompliance, or how the power dynamic involved in their employment translates to a power 
dynamic with their clients due to sanctions.  Five respondents (50%) identified MFIP policies 
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and procedures as inhumane or lacking consideration for subjective human challenges and 
experiences.  Five respondents (50%) described adopting time-consuming practices into their 
workflow to accommodate for errors or loopholes in rules, regulations or data systems.  Four 
respondents (40%) described a positive correlation between the size of a county or agency and 
the number of rules or regulations actively enforced.  Four respondents (40%) identified errors in 
data tracking or case activities at the county level as a factor in client disengagement or in their 
ability to do their jobs. 
Sanctions.  All ten respondents (100%) made statements about their reluctance to 
sanction or indicated negative feelings about the adverse material results of sanctions.  One 
respondent described a time-consuming succession of harms from sanctions and the associated 
practice of de-authorizing child care assistance: 
When [a] sanction is put in place, typically what follows is a snowball effect, if someone's 
not turned around and then try to cure their sanction with you, child care can be reduced 
to 0 hours, depending on the activity the client's in, typically and this is also at an 
employment counselor's discretion, typically if someone is working, they would choose to 
let this person keep their working hours of day care.  Because you don't want someone to 
lose their job because they aren't able to have day care. If someone's job searching, and 
not working or going to school, typically you would reduce those hours to zero.  
Therefore, the person has to reapply for child care, therefore they have good cause 
because they have no child care, and then it's a kind of whole process, you gotta reapply, 
and then we get back into whatever we were doing, so I yep I would say I do see children 
affected, I don't always directly see the children affected, but I've worked with enough 
kids and I've worked in daycares to know that if a child is in daycare and they're taken 
out of daycare that's going to affect them probably their siblings, probably their parents.  
(Respondent 4, lines 145-146) 
 
The same respondent described the general cycle of clients re-establishing the lost income when 
sanctions are applied: 
I mean there's the fact that your grant is being cut and so you have less money to feed 
your family, do things with your family, that that money is used for…I think just breaking 
down and having to rebuild what was established, happens a lot.  it's kind of a cycle.  
(Respondent 4, lines 147-148) 
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Five respondents (50%) described using NOITS /d the pressure to value the WPR is externally 
imposed from a broader regulating entity such as the county.  Three respondents (30%) indicated 
that the WPR has little meaning or that there is a link between WPR and sanctions.   
Family Stabilization Services.  Family Stabilization Services (FSS) is the state’s service 
category that enables more flexibility for clients who have submitted documentation of their 
medical or psychosocial challenges with compliance (DHS, 2007).  Eight of ten respondents 
(80%) mentioned FSS during interviews.  Seven respondents (70%) highlighted the importance 
of screening for FSS criteria.  One respondent described screening through the documentation in 
the client’s paper file for FSS criteria, and resultant changes in their treatment of clients: 
For a typical NOITS process, I would look through everything in the file, I would look 
through casenotes to see is there anything whatsoever going on with this client because 
as long as they were once FSS or once suspected FSS for something, they are always 
going to be treated that way. therefore, if someone is noncompliant and I find oh last 
year, you had this violence going on with somebody, then I'm going to treat you 
differently than a person who doesn't have that.  (Respondent 4, line 183) 
 
Five respondents (50%) described the unique checklist process caseworkers are to follow before 
sanctioning clients who are in FSS.    FSS eligibility was framed as something  
Paperwork.  Nine respondents (90%) mentioned paperwork as an aspect of their role or 
as one of the client’s obligations. Six respondents (60%) described the importance of specific 
pieces of paperwork such as medical opinion forms, activity logs, or household report forms.  
This category was not sorted based on affect of the respondent’s content (pro-paperwork or anti-
paperwork), but is notable because it underscores the role that paperwork plays in a caseworker’s 
position. 
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Discussion 
Sample 
The sample for this research was obtained using snowball recruitment, which was 
originally based off a convenience sample contacted by the researchers.  Four respondents were 
interviewed from this convenience sample, and then six more respondents contacted the 
researcher based on snowball recruitment efforts and completed interviews.  The snowball 
sampling was not random or systematic, so it is not generalizable to the broader group of 
caseworkers in MFIP or TANF.  It is possible that those caseworkers who chose to respond to a 
voluntary survey request from peers or colleagues are those who have a fundamentally more 
proactive view of their professional lives, or those who value research and evidence-based 
practices more.  Other reasons for respondents self-selecting their participation in the study 
include a dissatisfaction for MFIP policies or an acknowledgement of the type of competing 
priorities Lipsky identifies in street-level bureaucracies (2010).  The interview data and its 
compilation exists as a record of individuals at particular times, who work in different contexts 
that share MFIP policy and MFIP clients as commonalities.   
This sample may be non-representative of the average or typical caseworker population 
for several reasons.  Seventy percent of the sample worked in specialized programs with rules 
designed to cater to specific populations; because of this, caseworkers in the sample may have 
actually had more discretion or flexibility than the average MFIP caseworker.  The sample set 
was a highly-experienced collection of individuals, with an average MFIP work experience of 
99.8 months or 8 years, 3.8 months; this may be substantially higher than the amount of work 
experience the average caseworker has.  Additionally, the inclusion of three individuals with 
manager roles or hybrid manager-caseworker roles may mean that this sample on average, has 
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more insight into program and county operations or the systemic reasons for certain aspects of 
the MFIP program. 
Themes 
Caseworker Role 
Caseworker Functions.  One study describes how Illinois TANF recipients face distinct 
deficits in human capital, including lacking skills to deal with bureaucracies and workplace 
tasks, and education to read and write at a level that is functional in marketplace economies 
(Lewis et al., 2006).  Seven of 10 survey respondents (70%) described helping clients fill out 
paperwork or resolve bureaucratic errors as a major component in their job, perhaps because 
clients may display functional deficits in human capital.  Clients with functional deficits may be 
so overburdened with case-related paperwork that has nothing to do with employment services 
that they and their caseworker do not have time to do much else.  Although existing research 
does recommend integrative and culturally-specific employment services that can go deeper into 
client and family issues than resolving paperwork errors or tracking activity hours, it is uncertain 
how much caseworkers are able to embrace these approaches (Lee & Hines, 2014).  Sixty 
percent of respondents indicated the centrality of paperwork-based planning methods, which may 
not be culturally-specific; likewise, the education activities six of 10 respondents (60%) referred 
to promoting may not be what clients need to address underlying functional issues.  Community 
service referral was also identified as a job function by six of ten respondents (60%), which 
could help to address underlying challenges to employability.  
Caseworker Stances.  Existing literature points out that the caseworker role includes 
therapeutic elements, particularly in how the client conceives of the client-caseworker 
relationship (Soss et al. 2011).  This claim of therapeutic elements finds support in this research: 
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100% of respondents professed a client-considerate stance that includes client-centric and 
compassionate aspects.  These therapeutic elements are non-clinical and thus unbounded by the 
professional ethics of social work, psychology, or clinical counseling.  Caseworkers are rarely 
trained in counter-transference or the maintenance of positive regard in a professional 
relationship, which could explain why 60% of respondents also professed a client-suspicious 
stance, and 30% of respondents commented on the prevalence of an us-vs.-them dynamic 
prevalent in casework agencies.  Caseworkers are put into a position involving rapid rapport-
building and assessment of deeply personal facts about clients, but frequently lack formal 
training in assessment, boundaries, or mental health.  As these training areas can enhance both 
caseworker retention and job performance as well as client experience and growth, caseworkers 
exist in a middle ground full of compromises in service quality, confusion, and forced choices.  
One option for increasing caseworker expertise in rapport-building, assessment and mental 
health is providing additional county- or agency-funded training series for caseworkers that go 
deeper than a single session.  Another option would be for the state of Minnesota to require a 
proportion of caseworkers to have a degree in social work or mental health, and place those 
individuals in charge of assessment and mental health work. 
Expectations of Caseworker Role 
Caseworkers were asked what their expectations of their role were, and how those 
expectations changed based on the actual parameters of their roles.  Some respondents’ responses 
confirmed literature about the overly bureaucratic or overwhelming nature of the job, and other 
respondents identified paperwork and bureaucratic procedures as an expected part of their job.  
These findings are discussed in relation to points from the literature review. 
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Unexpected Bureaucratic Factors.  Social scientists who have applied the concept of 
street-level bureaucracy to TANF structures have referenced contradictory caseworker behavior 
as an effect of competing demands from TANF bureaucracies and TANF clients (Soss et al., 
2011).  Fifty percent of respondents indicated that their role involved more cases, more duties, or 
more responsibilities than they were expecting, indicating a mismatch between the bureaucratic 
demands of the position and the client-centric way caseworker positions are posted on job 
boards.  The objective aspects of the bureaucracy are often prioritized over the subjective needs 
of clients, as supported by the four respondents (40%) who described how the MFIP system is 
more about rules, case closures or paperwork than it is about getting clients to work or impacting 
client lives.  If the job of the caseworker is to address case closures, rule violations and 
paperwork demands, they may only rarely work with clients on goals that could help to lift them 
out of poverty (Soss et al., 2011).  Program improvements addressing this issue could involve 
freeing more time in financial workers’ schedules to address client concerns directly, changing 
eligibility requirements so that clients are not terminated from the program so quickly, or 
implementing new positions within nonprofits to more adequately help clients to plan and deal 
with functional tasks such as paperwork. 
Expected components of role.  Six respondents (60%) reported they had accurate 
expectations of the amount of paperwork and client tracking involved with the role; half of those 
respondents (30%) had personal experiences with the system as a child or an adult.  Only two 
respondents (20%) indicated that they had as much counseling in their role as they expected, 
compared with the four respondents (40%) who reported that the job is more about addressing 
paperwork problems and case closures for clients than it is about counseling.  No caseworkers 
indicated that there was less paperwork than they expected.  These findings support the claim 
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that personal experience with the program contributes to understanding how routinized the job of 
the caseworker is, and the claim that caseworkers may enter the job expecting a counseling role, 
to be met with a paper-pushing job.  Solutions to this disenchanting career revelation include 
more accurately representing caseworker position descriptions or splitting the job up into a 
therapeutic role and a numerical role, to be held by workers with different skills and aptitudes. 
Factors in Client Non-Compliance   
Bureaucratic factors in non-compliance.  Existing literature claims that TANF case 
managers’ conception of specific cases and clients come down to “moral assessments” of 
trustworthiness and work ethic; these criteria are necessary because caseworkers do not have 
time to gather clear-cut information, and their policies are not fully delineated (Soss, et al., 
2011).  When moral judgments occur in the minds of caseworkers with no clinical training, 
personal traits such as work ethic can appear more straightforward than they are.  Sixty percent 
of respondents indicated that employment plans or concern for the Work Participation Rate 
guides their relationship-building and the activities of themselves and their clients; these are 
areas where MFIP policy is uncommonly straightforward.  The Work Participation Rate has a 
discrete numerical limit, and employment plans are made in service of that goal.  The focus on 
work defines the activities clients can engage in to stay in compliance, which could be framed as 
an imposition on the autonomy of the client.  Caseworkers may perceive that clients whose 
autonomy is stifled do not value the program because they do not see its purpose within the 
context of their lives.  If the subjective lives of clients are being regulated by objective policies 
that require them to engage in a limited set of activities, it follows that 40% of respondents 
indicated MFIP does not actually solve problems or does not appear to clients to solve problems.   
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Family or community factors in non-compliance.  Literature has linked the imposition 
of a sanction on a case with the incidence of developmental diagnoses, including decreased 
cognition and behavioral issues that may be unacceptable to school authority figures, among 
preschool-age children (Lohman et al., 2004).  The correlation between sanctions as a potential 
causative factor in behavioral and developmental issues is echoed by the four of 10 respondents 
in this study (40%) who mentioned child-related incidents at school or in the community as 
factors contributing to non-compliance.  The correlation suggests a circular nature to problems of 
child development and behavior and family grant sanctions.  Literature claiming DSM diagnoses 
are more prevalent among single mothers on TANF than they are among single mothers 
generally is also supported by this study’s finding that two of ten caseworkers (20%) identify 
family issues related to single mothering as contributing to non-compliance (Jayakody & 
Stauffer, 2000).  The fifty percent of respondents who identified family violence as having a 
detrimental impact on client compliance also indicate that issues involving caregiver 
relationships can impact child development both in the witnessing of traumatic events and in the 
material hardship that sanctions produce for families.  Clients could benefit if caseworkers were 
given guidance to treat them as caregivers in a complex family unit, and to prioritize needs of 
children and the safety of everyone in the family over compliance or punishment for non-
compliance. 
Transportation barrier.  Eighty percent of counselors reported low access to 
transportation as a barrier for clients,  but only 40% of respondents reported that they can 
conduct home visits.  The literature reviewed for this study did not discuss transportation or 
infrastructural barriers clients face, but the mismatch between the proportion of counselors who 
acknowledge that transportation is a major issue in a sprawling urban area in a Northern state and 
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the number of counselors who are allowed to meet clients at locations of the client’s choosing is 
telling in itself.  Caseworkers are put into a situation where even though they know clients have 
issues getting around, they must require them to come to their office in order to maintain 
compliance.  This is a bind for both caseworkers and clients; both parties need the meetings to 
occur.  Possible solutions include more phone, email, or videochat based meetings and 
communications, or a broadening of the practices of home visiting or meeting in the community. 
Clients lacking skills.  A majority (60%) of respondents referred to concrete or 
organizational skills required for compliance that clients commonly lack, and 40% of 
respondents referred to a lack of soft coping mechanisms or a generalized disempowerment as a 
barrier to compliance.  This finding supports other literature in the field which asserts that human 
capital deficits present major barriers to compliance and success for clients (Lewis et al., 2006).  
Only 30% of respondents identified dysfunction in a major governmental system—MFIP, public 
transportation, or the police department—as a factor in how they think about client 
noncompliance.  This indicates that there is an implicit assumption that the client will have to 
bend to the systemic status quo to maintain compliance. Recommendations include training 
parents in executive functioning skills that work for them, rather than simply expecting they 
adapt to what a respondent identified as “middle-class lifestyle” skills.  Research has 
demonstrated that working with a family on executive functioning has positive effects for parents 
as well as children; family services and more environmentally-oriented interventions are 
recommended in conjunction with skill training (Center for the Developing Child, 2016). 
Mental or chemical health challenges.  Studies across the nation have supported the 
conclusion that mental and chemical health challenges occur at a higher rate among TANF 
clients than they do among the general population (Chandler et al., 2005; Danziger et al., 2000).  
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The 60% of study respondents who stated that mental or chemical health challenges contribute to 
non-compliance support similar claims nationally and in the state of Minnesota.  One study from 
a Southwestern state found that receipt of TANF benefits among mothers was significantly 
related to having serious mental illness (Person chi-square [1, n=489] = 5.017; p = .019) 
(Stromwall, 2001, p. 132).  Another study of national data from more than 116,000 individuals 
found that parents who have never received TANF reported a psychological distress score of .08, 
whereas “former TANF recipients’ average score was .26, and for the parents currently receiving 
TANF, the average score was .39” (Cheng, 2007, p. 44).  The increased incidence of 
psychological distress among TANF recipients matches caseworkers’ observations that clients do 
struggle with stress and mental illness.  A five-year longitudinal study of 843 MFIP recipients 
found that 34 percent had receive a diagnosis of a serious mental health condition, providing a 
local statistical benchmark to support caseworkers’ observations that mental health issues present 
a barrier to compliance with work requirements (DHS, 2008b).  Caseworkers are required to 
provide a referral to mental health services if clients indicate mental health challenges on the 
Self-Screen tool, but have no requirement to provide a referral to mental health services if mental 
illness is simply suspected or hinted at conversationally (DHS, 2015).  There are no instructions 
from DHS on how to discuss mental health diagnoses with clients or to work with clients on 
issues related to stigma, readiness to engage in mental health services, or comorbidity of 
diagnoses.  Caseworkers working with FSS clients periodically ask clients to update their 
medical opinion forms to re-verify their mental illness, which can include encouragement to 
engage in lasting therapeutic services, but do not have to.  The result is an incomplete set of 
directives for caseworkers to follow to address complex psychosocial challenges in clients’ lives, 
and a re-emphasis on paper documentation rather than meaningful engagement in services that 
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can help clients enhance functionality and move forward.  Cross-training between employment 
services and mental health providers could help to provide caseworkers with better 
understandings of the functional ramifications of mental illness, and a more relational toolset to 
work with clients on meaningfully addressing psychological challenges. 
Cognitive or learning disabilities and literacy challenges.  Six respondents (60%) 
brought up functional challenges clients have with complying based on their level of literacy or 
cognitive diagnoses.  In addition to the harmful and potentially circular logic of removing funds 
from a family whose parent may have developmental delays related to the lack of funds available 
during their own childhood, only 20% of respondents acknowledged that English language 
learners face specific challenges with compliance.  The lack of recognition of clients’ congenital 
or situational inability to complete bureaucratic procedures, read and understand program 
materials, and meet deadlines can impact the types of “moral assessments” that are conducted to 
save caseworkers time and fill in missing information (Soss et al., 2011).  Enhancing screening 
protocol for literacy and cognitive challenges, training caseworkers to go through paperwork and 
complex procedures in greater detail, and encouraging referrals to disability and literacy services 
could help caseworkers help clients who are experiencing these issues. 
Homelessness or unstable housing.  60% of respondents defined housing instability or 
homelessness as a barrier to compliance, and 30% referred specifically to difficulty receiving or 
keeping track of paperwork in those situations.  The stress and trauma frequently associated with 
homelessness in constellation is very difficult to quantify or define; combined with the focus on 
paperwork and deadlines that defines MFIP bureaucracy, even clinically significant conditions 
may be harder for caseworkers to screen for when clients are in the midst of noncompliance.  
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More could be done at state and county levels to bring together MFIP with housing assistance 
systems such as subsidized housing, public housing, and emergency shelter referral services. 
Child care shortage.  The need for dependable child care is likely at the top of the list of 
needs for single parents who have requirements to engage in activities without their children 
throughout the day.  Accessing child care can be a blanket prerequisite to engaging in other 
activities, which could explain why 50% of study respondents identified it as a barrier to 
compliance.  Thirty percent of respondents also brought up problems within the Child Care 
Assistance Program as being specific barriers to client compliance, suggesting that on top of 
monitoring the quality and consistency of potentially subpar childcare providers, clients have to 
deal with an unpredictable and ineffective bureaucratic program that may stop their supports at 
any point.  Further integration of social services with financial services in counties and among 
subcontractors could help address both child care issues and homelessness issues.  Collaboration 
between MFIP agencies, child care providers, and housing agencies could be facilitated by the 
county to bring the most benefit to clients’ lives. 
 
Decisions to be Made in Response to Non-Compliance 
Leniency-related decisions.  Good cause and the FSS category enable caseworkers to 
provide flexibility to clients when they need it.  Sixty percent of caseworkers in this study 
identified determinations of good cause, pre-FSS status, or general deservedness for leniency as 
choices caseworkers make based on personal assessments of clients.  When taken in a context of 
literature that describes constrained decision-making in bureaucracies due to workload size and 
over-regulation, these personal and often undocumented assessments made about clients can 
have harmful material effects on the lives of clients who may need the leniency to access 
CASEWORKER DISCRETION AND MFIP SANCTIONS 71 
 
services or recover from episodes of mental illness, trauma, abuse or chaos (Lipsky, 2010; Soss 
et al., 2011).  If caseworkers do not have the time to develop relationships with clients—because 
their paperwork takes up a lot of time, because their caseload size is too large, or because they do 
not engage with clients conversationally—these leniency decisions are made while in a stressed 
frame of mind, with limited information about client situations.  The risk of incorrectly assessing 
a client’s capability to comply or their work ethic could be the risk of applying a crisis-inducing 
sanction to a family that is already in crisis.  The fifty percent of respondents who identified 
decisions about leniency in Notice of Intent to Sanction (NOITS), home visits and curing 
sanctions also underscore the fact that making punishment discretionary can be detrimental to 
clients who have yet to present their legitimate impairments to their caseworkers. 
Calendar and timing decisions.  Bureaucracies are defined by routinized structures 
(Lipsky, 2010).  MFIP’s routinization is based around the calendar: compliance is tracked 
monthly, benefits are issued monthly, and requests to impose sanctions are due monthly (DHS, 
2015).  Seven respondents (70%) described how their decisions about discretionary actions are 
based on bureaucratic timing.  The timing mechanisms embedded in the bureaucracy are 
indifferent to when or how clients or their families are embroiled in crises, and equally 
indifferent to how caseworkers decide to build relationships with clients.  To emphasize an 
arbitrary calendar in the midst of subjective, meaningful, lived experience can be a constraint on 
caseworkers’ ability to think concretely and accurately about their clients’ lives.  Lipsky asserts 
that clients are required to bend to the routinized requirements of the bureaucracy, and that 
workers often defer to deadlines when the subjective needs of their clients conflict with the 
requirements of the bureaucracy (2010). 
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Effort investiture.  Half of the survey respondents (50%) described effort investiture as a 
choice.  With caseworker decision-making being constrained by numerous factors involved in 
street-level bureaucracy such as high caseloads, arbitrary calendar systems and numerical service 
outcomes, and with decisions to sanction having materially adverse consequences on families, 
the choice of whether to invest extra effort in each choice has significant ethical implications.  
Caseworkers internally resolve any qualms about constrained decision-making by assessing the 
client and referencing the less-ambiguous assessment they have made of the client as if it is 
accurate (Soss et al., 2011).  Forty percent of study respondents indicated their investment in 
processes of rapport building and outreach to noncompliant clients is discretionary as well; if a 
caseworker’s initial assessment of a client is not accurate, they may put less effort in to 
developing a rapport that could make the assessment more accurate.  Caseworkers may also put 
less effort into resolving sanctions with clients whom they assume to be responsible for the 
initial noncompliance.   
Recommendations include further systematizing the caseworker response to 
noncompliance to make it more equal across different clients, or doing away with punitive 
sanctions in general in favor of incentive-based casework or another model that is less 
susceptible to the subjective judgments caseworkers can make.  A solution that does not involve 
changing the MFIP system would be changing caseworker hiring practices to include more social 
workers or other professionals qualified to make psychosocial assessments of clients, effectively 
build rapport, and work processes of change with clients.  Existing caseworkers may benefit 
from more extensive case consultation with colleagues, discussion groups and education around 
engagement with individuals in poverty, internal incentives for high rates of client engagement, 
or more support from their agencies and supervisors around issues of burnout and fatigue. 
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Factors in Decision-Making 
Decision-making in street-level bureaucracies is complex because it is personal, but the 
personal interpretation of factors at both the agency (meso) level and the broader community 
level (macro) define the terms in which individuals make decisions (Lipsky, 2010).  For 
discussion, personal factors identified by respondents have been analyzed in conjunction with 
meso and macro level factors also identified by respondents. 
Personal factors and agency factors.  This section will contrast personal factors 
identified by respondents with agency factors identified by respondents.  Ninety percent of 
respondents referred to themselves as non-punitive, empathetic, or compassionate towards 
clients; 70% of respondents referred to flexibility in casework due to supervisor discretion or 
program design, and 50% of respondents indicated that county policies are increasingly non-
punitive, vague or flexible regarding sanctions.  This is in contrast with 60% of clients who also 
identified that policies at their agency or at large agencies in general decrease leniency and 
increase the pressure on caseworkers to impose sanctions.  Six respondents (60%) also described 
a punitive orientation or an attitude of blame or distrust toward clients.  The contradictions 
between these assessments is not erroneous, it is constitutive of the cognitive dissonance that 
complicates decision-making in street-level bureaucracies (Soss et al., 2011).  Caseworkers may 
at times conceive of themselves as compassionate, responsive providers, and recall specific 
clients mentally to support that self-identity; these specific anecdotes may strongly support this 
self-concept, but may not actually represent the way the caseworker behaves toward the majority 
of clients.  In other words, caseworkers may think they are being attentive to all their clients, 
when in fact they have segmented their caseload and are only giving that treatment to a select 
few of their clients.  This mental segmentation can be one way to cope with the pressure 
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caseworkers are under due to high caseload size, and to bolster their energy levels and the sense 
that they are doing the good work they entered the field to do (Soss et al., 2011).  This type of 
cognitive segmentation may be part of the experience of being a caseworker, but the underlying 
cognitive dissonance is also part and parcel of the ways that agencies and counties train 
caseworkers and monitor their activities.  Client requests and situations aside, contradictory 
messages from counties and employers result in confusion about job activities and complicate 
the ways that caseworkers think about situations and define themselves as either compassionate 
or punitive; this may be part of why some respondents identified themselves as both lenient and 
harsh.   
Personal identities of compassion and quality service provision can conflict with 
limitations on caseworker choice imposed by agencies.  Likewise, agencies can, within their 
scope and realm of control, counteract the flexibility counties impart on caseworkers.  Even the 
overlap between the 60% of respondents who identified that agencies constrain leniency and the 
70% who indicated supervisors and agencies support it makes sense in the context of street-level 
bureaucracy: rules and guidance can be as vague and contradictory as real life.  For many 
caseworkers, it is fundamentally a job at the end of the day—even ethical caseworkers may seek 
to preserve their employment if it comes down to a choice between granting leniency and 
following a rule.  Although many caseworkers enter the field of public service because they are 
called to make a difference in society, this dilemma may result in reduced job satisfaction and 
burnout. 
Personal factors and community factors.  This section will contrast personal factors 
identified by respondents with community factors identified by respondents.  Caseworkers are 
not ignorant of the system in which they operate.  Seventy percent of respondents indicated they 
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hold a personal belief that cash grants are too low and punishment is not an effective motivator 
for clients on MFIP, and 60% indicated that political and public discourse on the welfare system 
impacts the punitive and insufficient nature of the program.  The 60% of caseworkers who 
indicated that they talk to their clients about the dubious future of the program in relation to the 
current political climate, or who coach clients on how to advocate politically for themselves, 
support the notion that caseworkers will do what they can within their positions to help clients 
understand and pursue self-sufficiency.   This is congruent with Lipsky’s description of 
caseworkers maintaining a self-image of a proactive professional, and making choices within 
their constraints to help clients when they can (2010). 
Alternatives to sanctions.  Alternatives to sanctions are included in the category of 
factors in decision-making because caseworkers can only choose to do things that they perceive 
as an option.  As opposed to consulting a list of every possible alternative to a sanction, asking 
the question verbally is likely to limit the responses to those options that caseworkers 
consistently perceive as viable and accessible.  In effect, other options may as well not exist for 
caseworkers, if they do not think of them. 
The top alternative to sanctions, mentioned by 70% of respondents, was offering a 
medical form to a client or working with clients to get medical documentation of legitimate 
impairment.  This has the potential to put the client into the FSS category, which is much more 
flexible for clients and frequently involves less paperwork management on the part of the 
caseworker.  In this light, FSS may be perceived as an easy solution for caseworkers with clients 
who do not consistently hand in paperwork: everyone has less requirements when someone gets 
coded FSS.  The medical form was focused on almost exclusively as a piece of documentation 
that legitimizes client non-compliance; this is notable because decision trees in the MFIP 
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employment service manual first make mention of another piece of paperwork, the MFIP self-
screen (ES manual Appendix G-1).  This is a screening tool for chemical and mental health 
conditions that is to be used at certain junctures of noncompliance to see whether a client should 
be referred for a formal assessment.  Depending on the client’s score on the MFIP self-screen, 
the caseworker may be required to set up a psychological or chemical health assessment for a 
client, and continue to work with the client to gather documentation of their diagnoses.  A 
medical opinion form has the effect of freezing requirements for activity documentation from a 
client, whereas a self-screen increases the caseworker’s responsibilities to coordinate with a 
client and ensure they attend an assessment.  It is difficult to ascertain from the interviews in this 
study why caseworkers did not identify a self-screen as an alternative to a sanction; perhaps 
caseworkers have a disincentive to use the screening tool because of the interpretive work 
involved, or perhaps they do not see validity in self-reported mental or chemical health 
behaviors.  The self-screen can start a conversation about good cause, but it can also provide an 
opportunity for the caseworker to issue a medical opinion form; perhaps it is simply more 
efficient to give the medical opinion form to the client without even performing the self-screen.  
Five respondents (50%) brought up increasing contact attempts prior to sanctioning 
clients, which is more work for them; this is an action that is in alignment with the 90% who 
professed a compassionate perspective on clients, but it is a compassionate and discretionary 
action that requires investing only minutes of time.  Forty percent spoke of completing a home 
visit, which is a time-consuming and frequently mandatory aspect of job performance; however, 
one person spoke about performing an extra home visit, which is not mandatory.  The thirty 
percent of respondents who indicated they either had not thought about alternatives to sanction, 
or that the only alternatives were to dismiss activity requirements retroactively or provide more 
CASEWORKER DISCRETION AND MFIP SANCTIONS 77 
 
time to submit documentation, have some overlap with the 90% of respondents who professed a 
compassionate view toward clients.  Caseworkers are frequently so overloaded with processing 
requirements and meeting deadlines that they don’t have time to think critically about options in 
a situation.  The 40% of respondents who spoke of offering incentives as an alternative to 
sanctioning have the luxury of working for an agency that makes incentives such as clothing 
assistance or bus cards available; nonetheless, they are respondents who can mediate some of the 
conflicting demands to harvest documentation and to be kind and flexible with clients in a way 
that, as one respondent put it, “allows clients to keep their dignity.” 
Screening: types and frequency 
Existing literature supports the use of conversational or rapport-based screening as well 
as the use of clinically validated screening tools (East & Bussey, 2007; Lee & Hines, 2014; Lee, 
2005).  Respondents (60%, n=6) did validate that although it is time consuming, relationship-
based screening is more effective than paper-based screening.  Caseworkers referred to 
relationship-based screening as being deeper and involving more frequent meetings and a higher 
level of trust.  Paper-based screening refers to the use of screening tools such as the self-screen 
or the medical opinion form.  Half of respondents (50%, n=5) indicated that the use of screening 
tools is discretionary itself.  It is possible that caseworkers who do not engage extensively in 
rapport-building also use screening tools minimally.  It is also possible that caseworkers who 
notice that clients talk more to them when they take time to develop the relationship may be less 
apt to use formal screening tools which have clinical validity.  Although clinically valid 
screening tools exist, and MFIP guidance to caseworkers does specify that conversational 
screening is also valid, when caseworkers perceive both as discretionary, there is no guarantee of 
uniformity of screening.  In an environment where client disclosure of mental illness, substance 
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use or family violence is frequently hesitant at best, uniformity of screening takes on greater 
importance (Evans-Lacko, Henderson & Thornicroft, 2013; Larson, Vogel & Wester, 2007).  
Recommendations include standardizing screening measures across agencies, changing hiring 
practices to bring more professionals with more qualifications in screening into the field, or 
integrating mental health and family services with employment services for every client. 
Screening: good cause 
Good cause is a viable way for caseworkers to avoid sanction and grant leniency in a 
situation of noncompliance.  Good cause is documented in casenote form and is left largely to 
the worker’s discretion.  One respondent described a list of good cause reasons provided by their 
agency but maintained that granting good cause is the choice of the caseworker and a “grey area” 
(respondent 4, line 67).  Fifty percent of the respondents indicated that part or all of the burden 
for demonstrating good cause is on the client proactively demonstrating it.  This means that if the 
caseworker is not screening for good cause, or if the client has symptomatic reticence or poor 
rapport with the caseworker, good cause could go unrecognized.   
Fifty percent of respondents stressed the importance of screening for good cause.  
Statistics on the number of caseworkers more broadly within the Twin Cities metro area or state 
of Minnesota who actively screen for good cause are not available.  This information would be 
self-reported and subjective by nature, but if good cause screening and caseworker thought 
processes were to be the subject of further research, it would serve to expand upon research into 
decision-making and street-level bureaucracy within TANF.  Caseworkers recognize that good 
causes such as death in the family, homelessness or lack of transportation should be screened for.  
That some caseworkers also state that the burden for demonstrating good cause rests on the client 
illustrates the variance in screening attempts employed by caseworkers.  One caseworker 
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emphasized that their agency issues good cause notices at multiple junctures, so felt that their 
clients were adequately informed of their role in bringing it up to their caseworker (respondent 8, 
line 165).  Other caseworkers from specialized programs with lower caseloads spoke as though 
the rapport they held with their clients allowed good cause to emerge organically as part of the 
trusting caseworker-client relationship. 
Trauma and Stress 
Research has demonstrated correlations between clients being on TANF and experiencing 
psychological distress and resultant physical and occupational difficulties (Cheng, 2007).  This 
research is supported by the 90% of study respondents who spoke of the functional difficulties 
MFIP clients face with compliance.  Respondents conveyed understandings that self-image and 
self-efficacy are affected by trauma, and that cognitive symptoms such as brain fog and 
hypervigilance can be present.  Respondents demonstrated understanding of the connections 
between trauma, coping skills, and life crises. Seventy percent of respondents spoke about the 
ubiquity of present or past trauma among clients, showing an understanding that literature on 
TANF clients, mental distress, and functional impairments has also validated (Barusch & Taylor, 
2004; Cain & Hill, 2012).  These high rates of recognition of trauma’s impact (90%) and its 
prevalence (70%) stand in contrast to the lower rates of caseworkers who indicate that screening 
for good cause is important (50%) and those who believe that mental health conditions are a 
contributing factor in non-compliance (60%).  Trauma-informed care, a framework that has been 
implemented in mental health and health care settings, is a systems-wide commitment to working 
more effectively and compassionately with survivors of trauma (SAMHSA, 2015).  Principles of 
trauma-informed care, particularly the idea of universal precautions and being aware of the 
prevalence of trauma, could be implemented within MFIP services contexts with minimal 
CASEWORKER DISCRETION AND MFIP SANCTIONS 80 
 
adaptation.  This could enhance client engagement and boost outcome measures if the 
effectiveness of service delivery is monitored and maintained. 
 
Bureaucratic Factors 
Respondents’ comments addressed service compromises or incompatibilities due to 
bureaucracy. Half of respondents (50%) indicated that the MFIP bureaucracy does not recognize 
specific aspects of MFIP clients’ lives, or that the program is set up so that it doesn’t provide 
long-term benefit to clients or families.  Clients may have less incentive to develop a relationship 
with their caseworker or meet employment service requirements if they do not perceive that their 
strengths and needs are recognized or that the program will actually help to address their 
situation.  In this way, program design may contribute to client disinvestment or noncompliance.  
Punitive aspects of program design may compound this effect; half of respondents (50%) 
identified MFIP rules as inhumane or as failing to reckon and respond to the complex challenges 
in clients’ lives.  Research in the field indicates that caseworker flexibility and the coordination 
of services beyond those specified in TANF requirements is more realistic and appealing for 
clients; non-punitive, client-based activity engagement is an opportunity for programs to meet 
deeper needs of clients (Bussey & East, 2007; Cheng, 2007).  If caseworkers are accurate in their 
appraisals, MFIP misses opportunities to be more helpful to clients and families by failing to 
adequately reckon client needs, and incorporating unnecessary cruelty in its punitive aspects.  In 
addition to minimizing or eliminating the punitive aspects of MFIP, another recommendation 
could be to utilize a mobile caseworker model similar to targeted case management, which 
would enable caseworkers to better follow through on resources with and on behalf of clients, 
and could aid in rapport-building, engagement and goal-following. 
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Some respondents also identified inefficiencies and ineptitudes inherent in the MFIP 
bureaucracy.  An inherent tension exists between maintaining the WPR (and the assumed 
necessity to impose sanctions) and giving clients more time to amass documentation or deal with 
life challenges.  This tension was identified by half of respondents (50%) as a factor that makes 
decision-making less straightforward or more time-consuming.  Problems with paperwork or 
policies also reportedly consume caseworkers’ time, as half of respondents (50%) described 
using time to deal with paperwork errors or loopholes in the system.  Forty percent of 
respondents also reported that dealing with eligibility errors, disqualifications, or problems with 
data systems specifically takes up their time.  These reportings support Lipsky’s contention that 
street level bureaucrats must spend so much time resolving issues stemming from the complexity 
of the system that they are unable to render effective services for the public (2010).  The net 
result may contribute to a waste in time and resources for agencies and counties already pushing 
the limits of their budgetary constraints on human services. 
Sanctions 
Every respondent (100%) referred to a reluctance to impose sanctions on clients or 
recognized the harms of financial sanctions on poor families.  This includes the three 
respondents (30%) who also did not identify alternatives to sanction besides granting more time 
to clients; some respondents recognize the harm of sanctions, but do not have opportunities 
within their roles to come up with alternatives.  Caseworkers mentioning harms of sanctions 
display an understanding that corroborates social science literature describing material hardship 
sanction brings to families in terms of hunger, homelessness, housing instability and poor health 
(Casey, 2010; Lindhorst & Mancoske, 2006; Reichman et al., 2005).  Sanction notices were 
spoken about by caseworkers differently than the sanctions themselves; half of respondents 
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(50%) described using NOITS as a discretionary engagement tool, while 30% indicated they 
include threatening language in NOITS or letters to clients.  Although caseworkers may 
recognize the harms of sanction, not all caseworkers seek to avoid the perception of danger 
associated with the NOITS.  Three respondents pointed out that elements of the MFIP system 
lead to imposing sanctions with less consideration, supporting literature that indicates sanctions 
are imposed erroneously or for minor violations (Casey, 2010).  The imposition of erroneous 
sanctions or sanctions that were applied without careful consideration indicates a human rights 
calamity that would be solved by doing away with the punitive apparatus of sanctioning all 
together.  Instituting a more regular case recertification meeting would maintain some 
nonvoluntary aspects to the programming but remove the choice of whether to inflict financial 
punishment on clients. 
Researcher Reaction 
As a former caseworker, I have my experience to inform my understanding of what 
clients go through and how the system works.  I was caught on the inconsistencies in the 
bureaucracy while I was a part of it, and aware of the absurdity of the activity data we kept on 
clients.  I have convictions about the punitive ideology of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act that created TANF, and its inherent devaluing of caregiving 
work.  I have seen how MFIP’s low cash grant fails to support families adequately, and how the 
program functions to maintain a disposable workforce for businesses to exploit.  I’ve also 
worked with some of the most compassionate colleagues I have ever met, and been continually 
impressed by the generosity, intelligence, resilience and good character among MFIP clients.  I 
wanted to do a project that brought me outside of my own experiences on the program, and 
outside of the realm of my own directed reading on government cash assistance. 
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I sought to discard all of that and approach as a researcher who knew the questions to ask 
based on knowledge of clients and the system, rather than convictions about them.  Through the 
IRB process I shed the leading questions in my interview and as a result, the project became 
more exploratory.  The interviews themselves rarely dipped into conversationality and I sought 
to maintain fidelity to the spirit of the interview schedule with any elaborative questions.  I did 
not expect as many people to express detailed understandings of trauma and community factors.  
I did not expect people to have as much to say as they did—interviews that lasted more than an 
hour were allowed, but unexpected.  I was also surprised that I received contact from an 
additional respondent after I had cut off the recruitment period.   
The process of project development and implementation was more cumbersome than I 
anticipated, and I had expectations of putting in a lot of work.  At the point at which I had 
interviewed ten people, the project had momentum and it had gained a significance in my 
conception of it just because it was ten different voices added together.  I put together 
perspectives from caseworkers at two different counties and six different agencies, which felt 
significant.  Transcription was a chore and I put in large pieces of time on it.  With the use of a 
piece of software called MAX-QDA, I placed 1046 codes on my ten interview transcripts, and 
eventually sorted the codes into 31 categories.  One thing I learned is that there is no limit to the 
amount of comparison that can occur with this much data; to treat each interview as a case study 
and compare the intricacies of each could result in endless analysis.  I am also surprised by the 
connection I have to the data and my readiness to imagine other contexts for it. 
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Service Recommendations 
 Recommendations, based on comments from respondents, are made for change at the 
levels of caseworker behavior and decision-making, agency and county policies and procedures, 
and state- or national-level policy guidance. 
Recommendations at the micro level of caseworker behavior and decision-making. 
• Treat clients as caregivers in a complex family unit, and prioritize the needs of children 
and the safety of everyone in the family over emphasizing compliance or punishment for 
non-compliance. 
• Discuss how clients make plans in their own life, investigate stages of change for clients, 
and engage in co-planning for family changes on clients’ terms, beyond the creation of an 
employment plan.   
• Implement creative solutions to transportation barriers such as increased phone, email or 
videochat meetings with clients. 
• Approach rapport-building and relational casework with a consistent acknowledgement 
that MFIP clients are likely to have experienced trauma or have received a mental health 
diagnosis, and apply leniency consistently in any situations where there is an indication 
of this history with clients. 
• Use both rapport-based screening measures such as exploring challenges with clients in 
trusted conversation, and paper-based screening tools such as the Self-Screen. 
• Before applying sanctions, review case files, casenotes, and anecdotal information 
provided by the client for any evidence of good cause for noncompliance. 
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Recommendations at the meso level of agencies and counties. 
• Offer trainings for caseworkers in counter-transference, universal positive regard in 
professional relationships, and boundaries.  This may help to reduce unnecessary 
imposition of sanctions and enhance caseworker retention and job satisfaction. 
• Offer more rigorous and longer-lasting trainings in rapport-building and assessment of 
clients and their psychosocial environments.  This could enhance non-paper screening for 
real barriers to self-sufficiency in client’s lives, and cue caseworkers more appropriately 
on when referrals to mental health or community services could be beneficial. 
• Employ a larger workforce of financial workers in order to decrease caseload size and 
enable financial workers to handle issues related to case closures successfully and 
completely, which would increase time employment service caseworkers have to work 
with clients on goals and barriers. 
• Implement new positions within agencies and counties that focus on handling paperwork, 
eligibility and documentation needs, to free up time in caseworkers’ schedules to develop 
rapport, assess needs and work on goals.  Screen applicants for specialized positions 
based on skills and aptitudes to prevent burnout and increase productivity. 
• Make policy or program changes to enable caseworkers to work creatively with clients on 
transportation barriers, including using phone or electronic meetings and conducting 
home visits or meetings in community spaces. 
• Establish cross-trainng between employment services caseworkers and mental health 
professionals to provide caseworkers with better understandings of the prevalence of and 
functional ramifications of mental health conditions. 
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• Establish a system for coordination between mental health providers or case managers 
and employment service caseworkers. 
• Create a more rigorous follow-up process for caseworkers after issuing a Medical 
Opinion Form to ensure that clients know about services available and engage in those 
that suit them. 
• Institute more rigorous screening protocol for literacy and cognitive challenges; train 
caseworkers to go through paperwork and complex procedures in greater detail with all 
clients 
• Create a mechanism to make referrals to disability or literacy services more streamlined 
for caseworkers. 
• Establish more extensive case consultation in agencies, as well as discussion groups and 
education around engagement with individuals in poverty and individuals who have been 
through trauma. 
• Create internal incentives for clients with high rates of client engagement. 
• Create supportive feedback loops with caseworkers in agencies around issues of burnout 
and fatigue. 
• Re-allocate employment services funds in budgets exclusively to employment services 
program employees rather than splitting job duties and funds across programs in order to 
employ more staff and decrease caseload sizes. 
Recommendations at the macro level, for policies and discourse. 
• Abolish punitive financial sanctions and institute incentive-based compliance systems to 
encourage clients to work more closely with caseworkers on family goals. 
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• Align services for “normal” MFIP clients and those on the FSS program more closely to 
eliminate a dichotomy between the two service structures. 
• Create a state-level requirement that a proportion of caseworkers per county or per 
agency have a degree in social work or mental health, and place those individuals in 
positions involving assessment and mental health-related casework. 
• Change eligibility requirements and paperwork-related program cutoff schedules so that 
clients are not terminated from the program so quickly and they can engage more deeply 
with employment service caseworkers on longer-term goals related to psychosocial 
functionality and self-sufficiency. 
• Expand the set of approved activities for all clients and modify the employment plan 
creation process to prioritize client autonomy and choice, while supporting non-work-
related activities that enhance family stability such as family education, soft skills 
training, or therapeutic services for children, clients or their family units. 
• Conduct a survey of clients about what they need from the program and from their 
caseworkers.  Create a workgroup involving caseworkers and clients and follow 
suggestions from this group for modifying the program at the state level.  These efforts 
could help clients to perceive that the program can help them and may increase rates of 
compliance. 
• Track outcomes involving children and family units in the short-term as well as the long-
term, rather than using the engagement of adult clients in particular activities or the rate 
of program exit as the measure of program success. 
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• Establish systems-level coordination and information sharing between MFIP services and 
housing assistance systems such as subsidized housing, public housing, and emergency 
shelter services. 
• Eliminate or postpone child care assistance cutoff during periods of noncompliance. 
Limitations/Recommendations for Further Research 
This research has inherent limitations because it is qualitative, exploratory, and self-
reported.  The fact that respondents self-selected into the study means that they may not be 
representative of the typical caseworker.  The idea of the research was that self-reported 
explanations from self-selected caseworker respondents have validity as they show how 
caseworkers think, but more than that they show how caseworkers speak about thinking.  This is 
a critical difference because the presence of a researcher who is a social work student and who 
has worked in a similar role may come with pressures to appear or speak in a different way than 
they may if it was a systems analyst, or a completely impartial community member who was not 
conducting research.  Furthermore, there was no checking on any of the practices caseworkers 
self-reported.   Caseloads were not checked to verify whether rates respondents claimed they 
applied sanctions or good cause at were accurate, and casenotes were not consulted to verify 
claims of leniency.  Educational level and training type varied among the respondents; 
caseworker responses could be affected by these factors.  The sample had a high amount of 
professional experience in the field, which is not necessarily reflective of the caseworker 
workforce in general; in fact, two respondents (20%) noted that there is typically high turnover 
for caseworker positions. 
These limitations mean that further research, even among MFIP providers in the Twin 
Cities, could be conducted to expand the body of knowledge and diversify the interviewer effect.  
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More in-depth case studies of how caseworkers think and operate could include information 
about their caseloads over time, to highlight accuracies, trends, or inconsistencies.  A broader 
range of less experiential data could be collected by a more widely distributed survey of 
caseworkers.  If counties or agencies wanted to see the effects of caseworker thought processes 
on caseworker performance or behavior, research could involve multiple interviews and 
longitudinal data and could contribute to better training, recruitment, and supervision practices. 
 More research on power dynamics in TANF programs could further explore caseworker 
decision-making by involving concepts of compassionate regard and punitive action.  One study 
on perceptions of people with mental illness and resultant behaviors including avoidance and 
coercion could inform further research on caseworker responses to client behavior (Corrigan, et 
al., 2003).  The extent that trauma and mental illness affects MFIP and TANF clients is an area 
that can still be explored by researchers, as is the perception county workers or subcontractors 
have of clients.  When caseworkers perceive symptoms of trauma or mental illness as valid 
reasons for noncompliance, and when they are perceived as noncompliance punishable by 
sanctions, is a critical question to social workers who are concerned with equity in human 
services and the preservation of human rights for poor families.  If some clients are receiving 
discretionary lenience while others are not, the reasons for these differences can be explored and 
addressed.  Lipsky’s model of street-level bureaucracy provides a useful framework for county 
program analysts or social work researchers to examine caseworker decision-making in, and 
applying the model to noncompliance and mental health can yield more fully operationalized 
ideas and solutions. 
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Implications for Social Work 
 Social work training or education is not often a requirement for caseworker positions, and 
only one of the ten respondents (10%) had a license in social work.  Nonetheless, social workers 
come into contact with MFIP clients and awareness of the issues within the MFIP system that 
can contribute to or alleviate difficulties in client’s lives can contribute to services social workers 
are providing for clients.  Service is a core value in social work as defined by the National 
Association of Social Workers (1999).  Social workers in Minnesota can help families in need by 
addressing problems in the MFIP system, which categorically supports families in need.  
Problems with MFIP services involve clients, the components and rules in the system, and the 
decisions of people such as caseworkers.  Street-level bureaucracy asserts that the decisions 
caseworkers make are just as important as the letter of the law, which means in order to 
understand the policies as they are being enacted, social workers have to understand the way that 
caseworkers make decisions (Lipsky, 2010). 
 Social workers making recommendations on service implementation or policy changes 
can use the values of dignity and worth of the person and importance of human relationships.  
Caseworker discretion is a hallmark of street-level bureaucracy, but caseworkers within this 
study were empowered with different amounts of discretion, leeway and flexibility.  For 
example, caseworkers who worked within flexible programs or systems that incorporate home 
visits and allowed for smaller caseloads and greater rapport-building reported that these were 
valid alternatives to sanction that they employed to help people actually address problems.  
Social workers can be involved with advocating for obvious system change such as increasing 
cash grant amounts, but also changes to service structures that would solidify the importance of 
relationships as change agents.  As advocates, social workers can be involved with displaying the 
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connections between research and the recommendations listed in the Service Recommendations 
section.  MFIP clients should be able to retain dignity by avoiding punitive measures altogether; 
steps toward that goal include instituting better screening measures for mental illness, trauma, 
medical issues, literacy and cognitive factors, homelessness, and other factors.  Caseworkers 
could have more time to screen if the bureaucracy was simplified. 
 As leaders and stakeholders in agencies that may also have employment service 
divisions, social workers can push for the integration of service structures based on client benefit.  
Social workers have the expertise to know when psychosocial issues may be unseen factors in 
client behavior, and can engage in outreach and cross-training with caseworkers and county staff.  
Clinical, mental health-focused social workers can fill niches within their service areas by 
developing relationships with caseworkers, receiving referrals from employment service 
agencies, and working with referred clients to address issues rather than simply providing a 
diagnosis to re-verify FSS eligibility.  Broadly, social workers can use their privilege, expertise 
and influence to advocate for the abolition of punitive financial sanctions based on child welfare, 
developmental outcomes, or any outcome measure that takes a longer view of the fight against 
poverty.  It is incumbent upon ethical social workers to point out the ways that punitive sanctions 
serve to sustain intergenerational poverty rather than alleviate it, and to interrogate service 
structures for small changes that may counteract ineffective policies and measures. 
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to explore the ways that MFIP caseworkers make decisions 
in situations of client noncompliance.  Although the literature review focused on the harms of 
sanctions, the prevalence of mental illness among TANF populations, and the ways that street-
level bureaucracies affect caseworkers and clients, the exploratory research touched many more 
areas that impact caseworker decision-making.  This study helps to fill a gap in literature on 
TANF programs and on MFIP specifically, which is the link between factors at the micro, meso, 
and macro levels, and caseworker decision-making.  Caseworkers identified that client 
noncompliance can be caused by mental illness, environmental factors in clients’ lives such as 
lack of community capital and transportation infrastructure or domestic violence, but also that 
client noncompliance is frequently caused by factors internal to the MFIP bureaucracy, which 
clients have little influence on.  Although some caseworkers indicated clients can be to blame for 
noncompliance, caseworkers also referred to numerous ways that the structure of the MFIP 
system itself contributes to client noncompliance.  One respondent described how the system 
does not acknowledge challenges the clients are facing individually: 
We need to get certain things done regardless of what's happening on a client level.  hich 
is why the good cause and medical forms are in place, so that we can help with that, but 
as far as time is concerned, if we don't have someone engaged then we need to just keep 
going through the process to either follow through with non-compliance and a sanction, 
or grant good cause and have the person not count towards our WPR, if they're coded 
with a form or something like that.  Either way, they can't just drop off the report.  There 
has to be something showing this person is able to do this or they're needing. 
(Respondent 4, line 83) 
 
Deference to reports over complex factors in the lives of clients impairs the efficacy of a 
program that is supposed to instill and support self-sufficiency.  The pressure caseworkers feel 
surrounding reports and numerical outcomes undermines their ability to engage with clients and 
detect and respond to serious impairments and challenges in their lives.  Recommendations 
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include cross-training caseworkers with social workers and mental health providers, increasing 
service coordination and collaboration, and abolishing punitive financial sanctions in the MFIP 
program in order to establish incentive-based casework methods.  Ethical social workers can 
contribute to program improvements through advocacy, service coordination, cross-training and 
targeted mental health work within the MFIP population. 
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Appendix A: Interview schedule 
Decision-making around Noncompliance in the Minnesota Family Investment Program 
Interview Schedule 
 
1. What is your role in your position? 
2. Is your role different than the role you thought you would have when you took the 
position? 
• (If yes, how so?) 
3. What are the factors that lead to clients not complying with Employment Services? 
4. What types of decisions do you have to make when a client is not in compliance? 
5. What factors affect the way you make decisions in situations of client noncompliance? 
• What about you as an individual person affects your decision-making in 
situations of client noncompliance? 
• What factors within your agency affect the way you make decisions—for 
example, supervisors, colleagues or agency policies? 
• What factors within your community affect the way you make decisions? 
6. Have you noticed any themes that are common to families with caregivers who are not 
in compliance with Employment Services? 
7. What happens when clients are not in compliance, and what is your role in what 
happens? 
8. In what situations would you use alternatives to sanctions? 
9. What do you screen for when determining whether to apply a sanction? 
10. To what extent do stress and trauma impact your clients? 
11. Is there any other information you think would be important for inclusion in the study? 
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
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Appendix B: Informed Consent 
ST CATHERINE UNIVERSITY  
Informed Consent for a Research Study 
Study Title:  Decision-making around Noncompliance in the Minnesota Family Investment 
Program      
Researcher:  Andrew Kishel 
You are invited to participate in a research study.  This study is called MFIP Caseworker 
Responses to Client Noncompliance.  The study is being done by Andrew Kishel, a student in the 
Master of Social Work program at St. Catherine University in St. Paul, MN.  The faculty advisor 
for this study is Michael Chovanec, Associate Professor at St. Catherine University.   
The purpose of this study is to examine the decision-making process of MFIP Employment 
Counselors when working with clients who are not in compliance with their employment plan. I 
plan to examine what Employment Counselors can do to help participants who tell them they are 
having mental health problems.  I am also looking at how and when sanctions are used in 
Employment Services. 
Approximately eight people are expected to participate in this research.  Below, you will find 
answers to the most commonly asked questions about participating in a research study. Please 
read this entire document and ask questions you have before you agree to be in the study. 
Why have I been asked to be in this study? 
You were asked because you have at least six months of experience as an employment services 
professional and you work directly with clients.  You are familiar with agency rules and client 
requests.  Your experience with client situations and challenges makes your viewpoint important 
for this study. 
If I decide to participate, what will I be asked to do? 
If you meet the criteria and agree to be in this study, you will be asked to do these things: 
• Speak with me, one-on-one, in an interview format for 45-60 minutes, while being 
recorded digitally on my smartphone.  This will take place at a mutually agreed upon 
location including nonprofit office buildings or public library meeting rooms. 
• Take up to 5 minutes after the interview to discuss how it went and address any concerns 
you may have. 
• Allow me to transcribe the interview for analysis. 
What if I decide I don’t want to be in this study? 
 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary.  If you decide you do not want to participate 
in this study, please feel free to say so, and do not sign this form.  If you decide to participate in 
this study, but later change your mind and want to withdraw, simply notify me and you will be 
removed immediately.  You can also choose not to answer specific questions in the interview.  
CASEWORKER DISCRETION AND MFIP SANCTIONS 104 
 
Your decision of whether or not to participate will have no negative or positive impact on your 
relationship with St. Catherine University, nor with any of the students or faculty involved in the 
research.  Your employer will not be informed about your choice of whether to participate in this 
study or not, and the researcher will initiate no contact with your employer. 
 
What are the risks (dangers or harms) to me if I am in this study?  
 
I anticipate few risks because you are a professional and I will be asking professional questions.  
I will not ask for any sensitive or private information about you or your clients.  To limit your 
risk, I will be using an alternate name when transcribing.  My final analysis will be written so 
that a reader cannot connect your answers to you.  I will not specifically identify your agency or 
connect any demographic information to any responses.  Your job title, professional 
certifications, and any other potentially identifying characteristics will be described using general 
terms.  Demographic information will be presented in mean or amalgamated format to limit risk.  
As a participant in the interview, you can also limit your own risk by skipping any questions, 
ending the interview, or requesting that data not be included in the study.  These precautions are 
being taken to limit the possibility that somehow information on your decision-making reaches 
your supervisor or members of the public. Confidentiality is a priority in the way that I will store 
and transcribe the interview and data, and because information will be de-identified and analyzed 
along with that of other respondents, the risk of personal information or professional practices 
becoming public is minimal. 
 
What are the benefits (good things) that may happen if I am in this study?  
 
I do not anticipate that you will directly benefit from participating in this study.  However, the 
study will contribute to the fields of social work and social sciences in general.  Examinations of 
caseworker decision-making contribute to a body of knowledge and research that can lead to 
advocacy efforts, policy reform and the application of more functional practices in employment 
services and case management.  Studying the ways that Minnesota Family Investment Progam 
(MFIP) policies are implemented is important because families on MFIP are especially 
vulnerable and financially unstable.  Social workers in Minnesota and nationally will have more 
information on the human operations of welfare case management and will be better equipped to 
understand client situations and act on them. 
Will I receive any compensation for participating in this study? 
No. 
What will you do with the information you get from me and how will you protect my 
privacy? 
The information that you provide in this study will be recorded as digital audio on my password-
protected smartphone.  The audio will be transferred to my computer by USB cable the same day 
as the interview and at that point deleted from my phone.  The audio will then be transcribed into 
a word file identified only by its date.  In the transcript I will use initials that are not the same as 
your personal initials to differentiate between people.  I will keep the research results in my 
CASEWORKER DISCRETION AND MFIP SANCTIONS 105 
 
computer and only I and the research advisor will have access to the records while I work on this 
project.  I will delete all audio recordings at that point.  By May 20, 2017, I will destroy all 
transcripts and any records with identifying information that can be linked back to you. 
Any information that you provide will be kept confidential, which means that you will not be 
identified or identifiable in any written reports or publications.   If it becomes useful to disclose 
any of your information, I will seek your permission and tell you the persons or agencies to 
whom the information will be furnished, the nature of the information to be furnished, and the 
purpose of the disclosure; you will have the right to grant or deny permission for this to happen.  
If you do not grant permission, the information will remain confidential and will not be released. 
How can I get more information? 
If you have any questions, you can ask them before you sign this form.  You can also feel free to 
contact me at Andrew.kishel@stthomas.edu.  If you have any additional questions later and 
would like to talk to the faculty advisor, please contact Mike Chovanec at 
mgchovanec@stkate.edu.  If you have other questions or concerns regarding the study and would 
like to talk to someone other than the researcher, you may also contact Dr. John Schmitt, Chair 
of the St. Catherine University Institutional Review Board, at (651) 690-7739 or 
jsschmitt@stkate.edu. 
 
You may keep a copy of this form for your records. 
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Statement of Consent: 
I consent to participate in the study and agree to be audiotaped.  
My signature indicates that I have read this information and my questions have been answered.  I 
also know that even after signing this form, I may withdraw from the study by informing the 
researcher(s).   
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Signature of Participant     Date 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Signature of Researcher     Date 
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Appendix C: Demographics Sheet 
Demographics [printed] 
 
Thank you for participating in this research study on Decision-making around Noncompliance in 
the Minnesota Family Investment Program. 
Please circle an answer or fill in for all questions that you are comfortable answering. 
 
1. Gender: _____________________ 
2. Job Title: _________________________________________ 
3. Amount of experience in current position: __________years __________months 
4. Educational background:      bachelor’s     master’s     other: _________________ 
• Field of study: ________________________________________________ 
5. Other certifications: _________________________________________________ 
6. Do you work with a specific population within MFIP? Yes, No 
• If so, fill in that population: _____________________________________ 
(ie Family Stabilization Services, Family Violence Waiver, refugee 
population, etc.)’ 
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Appendix D: Recruitment Protocol 
You are invited to participate in a research study on decision-making in employment services.  
The study is being conducted by Andrew Kishel, an MSW student from the St Catherine/St 
Thomas social work program.  Part of the MSW program is to conduct an original research 
project that examines local issues, practices or policies.  Andrew is conducting research on 
factors that affect decision making in situations of participant noncompliance.  He would like to 
interview you and other employment service professionals 1:1, for 45-60 minutes, and then 
debrief for 5 minutes.  The research is entirely voluntary and you will be able to withdraw at any 
point; when it is completed, it may contribute to a body of literature on MFIP practices and 
policies. 
If you are interested in participating in this research and completing an interview, please contact 
me to authorize passing your information along, or contact Andrew Kishel directly by text, 
phone or email at 651-470-8342 (Andrew.kishel@stthomas.edu). 
 
